Direct Liability as an Arranger under CERCLA #107(a)(3): The Efficacy of Adhering to the Tenets of Traditional Corporate Law by Lawson, Lance A.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 71
Issue 4 Edward J. Murphy Memorial Issue Article 16
March 2014
Direct Liability as an Arranger under CERCLA
#107(a)(3): The Efficacy of Adhering to the Tenets
of Traditional Corporate Law
Lance A. Lawson
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lance A. Lawson, Direct Liability as an Arranger under CERCLA #107(a)(3): The Efficacy of Adhering to the Tenets of Traditional
Corporate Law, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 731 (1996).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol71/iss4/16
NOTES
Direct Liability as an Arranger Under CERCLA
§ 107(a)(3): The Efficacy of Adhering to the Tenets
of Traditional Corporate Law
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................. 732
II. CERCLA .................................................... 734
A. The Statutory Scheme ...................................... 734
B. Strict, Joint, and Several Liability ........................... 737
III. TRADITIONAL CORPORATE LAW: DISTINGUISHING DIRECT
LiABILITY FROM INDIRECT LIABILITY ........................... 738
A. Direct Liability ............................................ 738
B. Indirect Liabililty: Piercing the Corporate Veil ................ 740
IV. DIRECT LIABILiTY AS AN ARRANGER AND DIVERGENT VIEWS OF
THE CIRCUITS ................................................... 741
A. Arranger Liability Under CERCLA § 107(a)(3) .............. 741
B. Divergent Views of the Circuits .............................. 742
1. Actual Participation .................................. 743
2. Piercing the Corporate Veil .......................... 744
3. Authority to Control ................................. 745
4. Mere Sale of a Useful Product ....................... 746
5. Obligation to Control ............................... 747
V. UNITED STA TEs V. TIC IvEsfTM7-mrI CoRp ..................... 748
A. The Factual Background ................................... 748
B. The District Court Opinion ................................. 749
1. Owner-Operator Liability ............................ 749
2. Arranger Liability and Corporate Officers ............ 750
3. Arranger Liability and Parent Corporations .......... 751
C. The Eighth Circuit Opinion ................................ 753
1. Arranger Liability and Corporate Officers ............ 753
2. Arranger Liability and Parent Corporations .......... 755
VI. ANALYSIS OF TfC ............................................. 756
A. Arranger Liability and Corporate Officers .................... 756
1. Authority to Control ................................. 756
2. CERCLA's Goals and Defining Responsible Parties... 756
3. Actual Participation .................................. 758
4. Indirect Liability: Piercing the Corporate Veil ....... 759
5. Public Policy ......................................... 760
6. General Budget Policies ............................. 762
B. Arranger Liability and Parent Corporations .................. 763
1. Direct Liability ....................................... 763
2. Indirect Liablity: Piercing the Corporate Veil ........ 764
VII. PROPOSAL ...................................................... 765
VIII. CONCLUSION ................................................... 768
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
In expanding the reach of liability under the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),' courts
often ignore the fundamental corporate law principle of limited liability
provided to corporate officers, directors, and shareholders. Under CER-
CLA § 107(a) (3), a party may be liable for cleanup costs pertaining to a
"release" of hazardous substances where the party "arranged for" the dispo-
sal or treatment of the hazardous waste.2 However, the statute neither de-
fines "arranged for," nor expressly provides direct liability for
nonparticipating corporate officers, directors, or shareholders. Nonethe-
less, courts have found nonparticipating corporate officers and sharehold-
ers directly liable as "arrangers" without piercing the corporate veil. In
doing so, courts have disregarded the limited liability provided by the cor-
porate form.
This Note focuses on the challenge of determining whether a corpo-
rate officer or parent corporation "arranged for" the disposal of hazardous
substances. Specifically, this Note will address the circumstances under
which it is appropriate for courts to impose liability upon a corporate of-
ficer or parent corporation either directly as an "arranger" under CERCLA
§ 107(a) (3), or indirectly by piercing the corporate veil, for a corporation's
(or subsidiary's) hazardous waste disposal or treatment activities.
One of the primary concerns regarding CERCLA's expanding web of
liability is whether, and under what circumstances, this web may reach cor-
porate officers, directors, and shareholders. While struggling to define
CERCLA's boundaries, recent federal court decisions have broadly inter-
preted CERCLA's liability structure.3 As a result, the issue of liability for
corporate officers and parent corporations under CERCLA continues to be
a primary area of concern.
4
1 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C. and at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 199.1)) [hereinafter CERCL.A], amended
by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) [hereinafter SARA].
2 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
3 See infra Parts IV and V.
4 See, e.g., ALLANJ. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE (1992); Ronald
G. Aronovsky & Lynn D. Fuller, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Substance Releases Under
CERCLA, 24 U.S.F. L. REv. 421 (1990) (arguing that imposing direct liability on parent corpora-
tions and individual shareholders is consistent with both CERCLA and the principle of limited
liability); Richard G. Dennis, Liability of Officers, Directors and Stockholders Under CERCLA: The Case
for Adopting State Law, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1367 (1991) (arguing that courts should apply state corpo-
rate law when evaluating liability for officers, directors, or stockholders); Michael P. Healy, Direct
Liability For Hazardous Substance Cleanups Under CERCLA: A Comprehensive Approach, 42 CAsE W.
REs. L. REv. 65 (1992) (arguing that the proper standard for direct liability for parent corpora-
tions is based upon actual involvement in hazardous waste disposal activities); Tom McMahon &
Katie Moertl, The Erosion of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrines in Environmental Cases, 3 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T 29 (1988) (arguing that court decisions have eroded the traditional corporate
law doctrine of limited liability for officers, directors and shareholders); Gregory P. O'Hara, Mini-
mizing Exposure to Environmental Liabilities For Corporate Officers, Directors, Shareholders and Successors,
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER HIGH TECH. Lj. 1 (1990) (noting that environmental liability can reach
far beyond the protection of the corporate shell); Lynda J. Oswald, New Directions in Joint and
Several Liability Under CERCLA , 28 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 299 (1995) (arguing that Congress should
amend CERCA to eliminate the heavy burdens the liability provisions put on defendants) [here-
inafter Oswald, Joint and Several Liability]; LyndaJ. Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals Under CER-
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Traditionally, the corporate form protected officers, directors, and
parent corporations by limiting their liability-they could only be directly
liable for the debts or liabilities of the corporation in which they actively
participated. Without active participation, courts could only impose indi-
rect liability on nonparticipating officers, directors, and shareholders by
piercing the corporate veil. Several courts, however, have ignored the lim-
ited liability of the corporate form and imposed direct liability on nonpar-
ticipating officers and shareholders when interpreting CERCLA.5 These
courts reason that the statute's goals and remedial nature warrant ignoring
the corporate form.
6
For example, in United States v. TIC Investment Corp.,7 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit evaluated whether a corporate officer and a
parent corporation could be liable as arrangers under CERCLA
§ 107(a) (3) where neither the corporate officer nor the parent corpora-
tion had direct involvement in the corporation's hazardous waste disposal
activities. In finding the corporate officer directly liable under the statute,
the court of appeals held that the proper standard for imposing direct ar-
ranger liability under CERCLA § 107(a) (3) is whether the corporate of-
ficer had "the authority to control and did in fact exercise actual or
substantial control, directly or indirectly, over the arrangement for dispo-
sal, or the off-site disposal, of hazardous substances." 8 The court of appeals
CLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. ENvrL. Arr. L. REv. 579 (1993) (discussing application of strict
liability under CERCLA upon officer and individual shareholders) [hereinafter Oswald, Strict Lia-
bility]; LyndaJ. Oswald & Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and the "Erosion" of Traditional Corporate Law
Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 259 (1992) (arguing that, while courts' analyses do not emphasize
corporate law, the courts' results are largely consistent with corporate law) [hereinafter Oswald &
Schipani]; Perry E. Wallace, Jr., Liability of Corporations and Corporate Officers, Directors, and Share-
holders Under Superfund: Should Corporate and Agency Law Apply , 14J. Corn,. L. 839 (1989) (arguing
that traditional corporate law should apply to CERCLA and courts should look to federal com-
mon law when piercing the corporate veil); HaroldJ. Cronk & Pat Huddleston, II, Comment,
Corporate OfficerLiabilityforHazardous Waste Disposal: What are the Consequences?, 38 MERCER L REv.
677 (1987) (discussing the effects of increased liability on corporate officers) [hereinafter Cronk
& Huddleston, Corporate Officer Liability]; Richard S. Farmer, Note, Parent Corporation Responsibility
for the Environmental Liabilities of the Subsidiay: A Search for the Appropriate Standard, 19 J. Coat. L.
769 (1994) (discussing several alternatives standards for parent corporation liability and arguing
for a standard that requires parent corporations to exercise due care to ensure the financial
viability of the subsidiary) [hereinafter Farmer, Parent Corporation Responsibility]; Anne D. Weber,
Note, Misery Loves Company: Spreading the Costs of CERCLA Cleanup, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1469 (1989)
(arguing that the liberal interpretation of CERCIA's liability scheme leads to inequitable results)
[hereinafter Weber, Spreading the Costs]; Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste
Cleanup and Damages, 99 HAuv. L. Ruv. 986 (1987) (arguing that limited liability provided to
parent corporations undermines federal interests) [hereinafter Note, Liability of Parent
Corporations].
5 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding officer and
shareholder directly liable because his status as the person in charge of the facility was sufficient
to find him liable as an "operator"); United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 764 F. Supp. 565
(E.D. Mo. 1991) (holding president and majority shareholder liable because he had the authority
to control the hazardous waste disposal activities); Kelly v. ARCO Industries Corp., 723 F. Supp.
1214 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (holding that an officer may be liable where the officer had the authority
to control and could have prevented the release of the hazardous substance).
6 See supra note 5.
7 68 F.3d 1082 (1995).
8 Id. at 1089.
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announced that the standard applied equally to corporate officers and par-
ent corporations. 9
Even though they may have arrived at the appropriate result, the
Eighth Circuit's opinion blurs the line between direct liability for activities
a party engages in and the corporate law doctrine that provides limited
liability to nonparticipating officers and shareholders. The court's holding
that a corporate officer or parent corporation could be directly liable as an
arranger for indirect activities (i.e., without actual participation in hazard-
ous waste disposal activities) is, in the absence of an express statutory provi-
sion, outside the bounds of traditional corporate law.
This Note argues that courts should hold a corporate officer directly
liable as an arranger under CERCLA § 107(a) (3) where the corporate of-
ficer actually and directly participated in the arrangement for disposal of
hazardous substances. Merely as a shareholder, the parent corporation
cannot be directly liable as an arranger. When the corporation and the
shareholder, however, share such unity of interest and ownership between
them that the they no longer exist as separate entities, and an inequitable
result would follow if the corporate form is not disregarded, then courts
should pierce the corporate veil to impose indirect liability on the corpo-
rate officer or shareholder for a corporation's (or subsidiary's) arranger
liability.
In Part II, this Note describes the liability scheme of CERCLA. Part III
discusses and distinguishes the direct and derivative bases of liability. Part
IV explores the history of arranger liability under CERCLA, and then dis-
cusses the different standards applied by the courts of appeals when ad-
dressing the issue. Part V describes the factual and procedural background
in TIC, and details the Eight Circuit's reasoning. Part VI examines the ap-
propriateness of the Eighth Circuit's analysis and decision in TIC. This
Note argues that the Eighth Circuit, in announcing its standard for impos-
ing arranger liability on corporate officers or parent corporations, strayed
too far away from traditional corporate law doctrine. In Part VII, this Note
proposes that in determining liability of corporate officers, directors, and
shareholders under CERCLA § 107(a) (3), courts should adhere to the fun-
damental corporate law principle of limited liability. Finally, Part VIII
presents concluding remarks.
II. CERCLA
A. The Statutory Scheme
Congress enacted CERCLA 10 in 1980 in the wake of numerous envi-
ronmental disasters that occurred in the 1970s. 11 Among the more publi-
cized incidents were the "Valley of Drums" in Kentucky where hazardous
9 I&. at 1092. The court remanded the issue of the parent corporation's direct liability back
to the district court for further fact finding. Id. at 1092-93.
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
11 See generally SENATE COMM. ON ENVT. & PUBLIC WoRKs, 9 7 TH CONG., 2D SEss., A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY Acr OF
1980 (SUPERFUND), Pub. L. 96-510 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter CERCLA's LEGISLATrVE
HISTORY].
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substances in over 17,000 drums were seeping into the local water,' 2 the
discharge of the hazardous insecticide kepone into the James River in Vir-
ginia,' 3 and the infamous Love Canal tragedy in NewYork. 14 Under public
pressure to take action, Congress responded by enacting CERCLA which
gave the federal government the ability to immediately respond to releases
of hazardous substances.' 5
CERCLA is a remedial, rather than fault based, environmental statute
with two stated purposes: "(1) to provide for clean-up if a hazardous sub-
stance is released into the environment or if such release is threatened, and
(2) to hold responsible parties liable for the costs of these clean-ups."' 6
CERCLA § 104 authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
commence remediation operations at a site that is contaminated with haz-
ardous waste,' 7 and the EPA may use resources from the "Superfund" to
initially fund the remediation operation.' s
CERCLA gives the EPA two options to involve responsible parties in
hazardous waste cleanup operations: The EPA can either order the re-
sponsible party to commence cleanup operations pursuant to CERCLA
§ 106,19 or the EPA may conduct the remedial measures itself pursuant to
CERCLA § 10420 and sue the responsible parties for cleanup costs under
CERCLA § 107(a). 21 Further, responsible parties who incur costs related
12 More than 17,000 drums were seeping into the local land water near Louisville, Kentucky,
and streams flowing into the Ohio River contained hazardous substances. See H.R. REP. No. 1016,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1980), reprinted in 2 CERCIA's LE:IsLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
11, at 49, cited in Healy, supra note 4, at 68 n.8.
13 A federal grand jury indicted Allied Chemical Co. for illegally discharging kepone, an ant
and roach poison, into the James River at Hopewell, Virginia. The company received a
$5,000,000 fine for the violation. See S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1 CER-
CLA's LEGIsLATiVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 318, cited in Healy, supra note 4, at 69 n.9.
14 See, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. 30,931 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Randolph, co-sponsor of CER-
CLA), reprinted in 1 CERCLA's LEGISLATIVE HISToRY, supra note 11, at 684 (Congress passed CER-
CIA to respond to the "national consciousness largely as a result of the severe health problems
discovered at Love Canal"), quoted in Oswald & Schipani, supra note 4, at n.22. Love Canal soon
became synonymous with hazardous waste disasters. In 1978, residents of a neighborhood in New
York discovered contamination from chemicals leaking from a hazardous waste dump site, and
President Carter promptly declared the neighborhood a disaster area:. See S. Rep. No. 848, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10 (1980), reprinted in 1 CERCLA's LEGiSLArnV HISTORY, supra note 11, at 315-
17, cited in Healy, supra note 4, at n.7.; Robert D. McFadden, Love Canak A Look Back, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 1984, at B6.
15 See generally Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 1 (1982) (providing a compre-
hensive review of the legislative history of CERCLA).
16 H.R. Rep. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.N.
3038, 3038. See also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) ("CERCLA both provides
a mechanism for cleaning up hazardous[-)waste sites, and imposes the costs of the cleanup on
those responsible for the contamination.") (citations omitted).
17 CERCLA defines "hazardous substance" broadly as substances defined as hazardous or
toxic under the Clean Water Act § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (2) (A) (1988), and § 317, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1317(a) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 9602 (1988); RCRA§ 3001, 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1988); Clean Air Act
§ 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988); and Toxic Substances Control Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1988).
18 The term "Superfund" is used in two ways. Technically, "Superfund" refers to the fund
Congress created to enable the EPA to finance immediate cleanup costs of abandoned waste
chemical dump sites. CERCLA § 111 (42 U.S.C. § 9611) specifies the procedures for using the
fund. A tax paid mostly by petrochemical companies funds the Superfund. 26 U.S.C. § 9507
(1988)'. Additionally, "Superfund" is commonly used to refer to the entire act.
19 42 U.S.C. § 9606.
20 42 U.S.C. § 9604.
21 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
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to the cleanup activities are entitled to seek contribution from other
parties.2
2
To establish a prima facie case for liability under CERCLA, a plaintiff
must prove the following five elements: (1) the defendant is a responsible
party;23 (2) there has been a release, or threat of release, of a hazardous
substance at the a site;24 (3) the site is a "facility";25 (4) the plaintiff in-
curred response costs relating to the release;26 and (5) the response taken
and the corresponding costs conform with CERCLA's National Contin-
gency Plan.2 7 This Note will focus on the first element: determining
whether corporate officers or shareholders, as arrangers, are responsible
parties. CERCLA § 107 contains the statute's liability provisions. Arrang-
ers are one of four categories of responsible parties specified in CERCLA
§ 107(a): (1) current owners or operators of a hazardous waste vessel or
facility; (2) any person who formerly owned or operated a facility at the
time hazardous waste was disposed of at the site (owner/operator); (3) any
person who arranged for the disposal or treatment of a hazardous sub-
stance at any facility owned or operated by another person (arranger or
generator); and (4) any person who transported a hazardous substance to a
facility.28 The statute broadly defines "person" to include individuals, cor-
porations, and other business entities.2 9 Moreover, most courts determin-
22 42 U.S.C. § 9606(c).
23 Defined in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4).
24 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
25 Defined in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
26 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
27 Id.
28 Id. at (1)-(4) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set
forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner or operator of a vessel or facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or oper-
ated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for the disposal or
treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party
or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to dis-
posal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from
which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response
costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government
or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with
the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the
reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a re-
lease; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under section
9604(I) of this title.
Id
29 "The term 'person' means an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, con-
sortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, com-
mission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). See
Oswald, Strict Liability, supra note 4, at 587 n.29 for a detailed discussion of the contrast between
CERCLA not naming which individuals or under what capacity or circumstances, and other envi-
ronmental statutes specifically naming officers, agents, and shareholders. One should note that
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ing liability under CERCLA interpret the statute's scope of liability very
broadly.30
B. Strict, Joint, and Several Liability
Courts interpreting CERCLA have imposed strict liability on responsi-
ble parties.3 ' Additionally, courts have interpreted the statute to permit,
but not require, joint and several liability.
32
The statute provides responsible parties with five defenses to liability:
(1) "innocent purchaser" defense;33 (2) act of God, (3) act of war, (4) un-
related third party; or (5) federally permitted release.- 4 These defenses are
the statute specifies "corporation" and not corporate officers, directors, shareholders or parent
corporations. See infra Part I.A.
30 See, United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1990) (since CERCIA is
remedial in nature, courts should "construe its provisions liberally to avoid frustration of the
beneficial legislative purpose.") (quoting Dedham Water Co. V. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc.,
805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986)), cert. denie 498 U.S. 1084 (1991); United States v. Aceto
Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989) ("Congress used broad language in
providing for liability for persons who 'by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for' the
disposal of hazardous substances.... [C]ourts have concluded that a liberal judicial interpreta-
tion is consistent with CERCLA's 'overwhelmingly remedial' statutory scheme.'"); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986); Oswald & Schi-
pani, supra note 4, at 269; Wallace, supra note 4, at 863.
31 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) provides that CERCIA's standard of liability shall be the same as the
standard of liability under § 311 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988), which courts
have unanimously interpreted as strict liability. See, e.g., United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d
1082, 1086 ("CERCLA § 107(a) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (3), imposes strict liability upon 'any per-
son' who arranged for the disposal or transportation for disposal of hazardous substances.")
(quoting Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir.
1986)); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 & n.11 (4th Cir. 1988) ("We agree with
the overwhelming body of precedent that has interpreted § 107(a) as establishing a strict liability
scheme."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989). For a detailed discussion of CERCIA's strict liability
standard, see Oswald, Strict Liability, supra note 4.
32 See, e.g., Monsanto at 171 ("While CEROILA does not mandate the imposition ofjoint and
several liability, it permits it in cases of indivisible harm.").
33 This is an affirmative defense for one who purchases contaminated property if the pur-
chaser can establish that he or she did not know, and had no reason to know, of any hazardous
substance contamination at the site at the time of the purchase. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (B).
34 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) provides:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise
liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of
release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused
solely by -
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war,
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defend-
ant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relation-
ship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except where the sole
contractual arrangement arises from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a
common carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance con-
cerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in
light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foresee-
able acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
The "innocent third party defense" is a defense to CERCLA's strict liability where the dam-
age to the environment results solely from an act or omission of a third party (other than an
employee or an agent of a defendant, or a party with a direct or indirect contractual relationship
with a defendant), and the defendant establishes with a preponderance of the evidence that he
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limited, however, since the strict liability nature of CERCLA means that
proof, or lack thereof, of the defendant's culpable conduct is immaterial to
the issue of liability.3
5
III. TRADITIONAL CORPORATE LAw: DISTINGUISHING DIREcT LIABrLiTy
FROM INDIRECT LIABILry
A. Direct Liability
A party is directly liable for the tortious acts in which the party actively
participates.3 6 The basis of the tort may be either common or statutory law.
Because the corporation is a separate legal entity, the corporation is re-
sponsible for the torts it commit.
3 7
An important distinction between corporations and their officers is
that corporate officers are generally not individually liable for the debts or
liabilities of the corporation. A fundamental characteristic of the corpo-
rate form is limited liability for officers and shareholders. 38 The protective
shield of the corporation provides the corporate officer with incentive to
work for the corporation without risking personal liability for torts in which
she does not participate. Likewise, the protective shield provides the share-
holder incentive to invest in corporate ventures.3 9 However, as with tort
liability, corporate officers may be personally liable for the torts they com-
mit.4 ° Direct liability is not based upon the corporation's acts or the of-
ficer's position in the corporation; rather, it is based upon the officer's
actual participation in, or consent to, wrongful conduct.41 If a corporate
or she exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substances and took reasonable precau-
tions against the foreseeable acts or omissions of third parties. CERCLA § 107(b).
35 See generally, Oswald, Strict Liability, supra note 4.
36 SeeW. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 1, at 6 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER] ("The law of torts... is concerned with the allocation of losses arising out
of human activities .... The purpose of the law of torts is to adjust these losses, and to afford
compensation for injuries sustained by one person as the result of the conduct of another.")
(quoting Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 238 (1944)), quoted in Wallace,
supra note 4, at 850 n.66.
37 1 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 33
(James Solheim & Kenneth Elkins eds., rev. ed. 1994) [hereinafter W. FLETCHER].
38 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 37, § 14. For the purposes of this Note, "owners" and "share-
holders" are used interchangeably.
39 Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 4, at 431.
40 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 37, § 1135, at 290 ("Corporate officers are liable for their
torts, although committed when acting officially."); Traditional tort law holds individuals liable
for the torts they commit, and the individual is not relieved of that liability if the individual is an
agent working for a principle. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958) ("An agent who
does an act otherwise a tort is not relieved from liability by the fact that he acted at the command
of the principal or on account of the principal. . . ."). Similarly, corporate officer liability at-
taches regardless of whether the corporate officer was acting in the officer's official capacity when
committing the tort. 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 37, § 1135.
41 See, e.g., Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978):
A corporate officer is individually liable for the torts he personally commits and cannot
shield himself behind a corporation when he is an actual participant in the tort... The
fact that an officer is acting for a corporation also may make the corporation vicariously
or secondarily liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior; it does not however
relieve the individual of his responsibility.
(citations omitted); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141, 1144 (4th Cir.
1975) ("If a director does not personally participate in the corporation's tort, general corpora-
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officer does not actively participate in the tortious conduct, then a court
may only impose indirect liability on the officer by piercing the corporate
veil. 42
A fundamental tenet of corporate law is the limited liability provided
to corporate officers, directors, and shareholders. The common law recog-
nizes the corporation and its shareholders as separate legal entities. 43 Lim-
ited liability for individual shareholders means that a shareholder's liability
with respect to debts or wrongful acts of the corporation is limited to the
shareholder's investment in the subsidiary.44 Most states adopted the lim-
ited liability rule for corporations by the late 1830s. 4
The mere status of a party as a shareholder, by itself, does not warrant
imposing direct liability on the shareholder for the corporation's debts.
Corporate law provides that shareholders merely hold an ownership inter-
est in the corporation. They do not manage the corporation; they elect
officers to manage the corporation.46 Consequently, nonparticipatory
shareholders cannot be directly liable for a corporations debts or wrongful
acts.
Frequently, the majority or primary shareholder of a corporation is
another corporation-a "parent" corporation. Since the parent corpora-
tion is viewed as a shareholder, the previous discussion on limited liability
for shareholders applies to parent corporations as well.47 Thus, parent cor-
don law does not subject him to liability simply by virtue of his office.") (citations omitted);
Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., 467 F. Supp. 841, 852 (N.D. Cal.
1979) ("Courts have, however, consistently stated that a corporate executive will not be held
vicariously liable, merely by virtue of his office, for the torts of corporation."), afid, 658 F.2d 1256
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982); 3AW. FLETCHER, supra note 37, § 1137, at 300-
02 provides:
An officer of a corporation who takes part in the commission of a tort by the corpora-
tion is personally liable for resulting injuries; but an officer who takes a part in the
commission of the tort is not personally liable to third persons for the torts of other
agents, officers or employees of the corporation. Officers and directors may be held
individually liable for personal participation in tortious acts even though they derived
no personal benefit, but acted on behalf, and in the name of, the corporation, and the
corporation alone was enriched by the acts.
Some knowledge and participation, actual or implied, must be brought home to
the agent.
Id.
42 3AW. FLETCHER, supra note 37, § 1137, at 300-01 (stating that "it is necessary to pierce the
corporate veil in order to impose personal liability upon a nonparticipating corporate officer").
43 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 37, § 25 at 514.
44 Many commentators consider the limited liability for owners of a corporation to be essen-
tial to a free market economy: limited liability encourages owners to invest capital in the
corporation.
[L]imited liability is considered a fundamental characteristic of the corporate form.
Commerce and free enterprise, it was thought, could only flourish if shareholders and
their personal wealth were insulated from the risks associated with owning a business
enterprise. Thus, corporate shareholders, whether individuals or parent corporations,
are typically regarded as entities distinct from the corporation itself ....
Oswald & Schipani, supra note 4, at 262 (citations omitted); see also Farmer, Parent Corporation
Responsibility, supra note 4, at n.16.
45 Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 4, at 430.
46 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 37, § 25.
47 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
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porations cannot be directly liable for the debts or wrongful acts of its sub-
sidiary corporation.
In summary, traditional corporate law provides that a corporate officer
is only directly liable where the officer actually participated in, or con-
sented to, the wrongful acts of the corporation. Additionally, the limited
liability of the corporate form provides that nonparticipatory shareholders
cannot be directly liable for a corporations debts or wrongful acts.
B. Indirect Liability: Piercing the Corporate Veil
Courts will only disregard the independent existence of the corpora-
tion and its shareholders and impose indirect liability on the officers or
shareholders in the rare cases when it is in the interest ofjustice.4s Indirect
liability is an exception to the limited liability for officers, directors and
shareholders (and, hence, parent corporations) of a corporation and is
commonly referred to as piercing the corporate veil. It is an equitable doc-
trine that courts typically apply in one of two situations: (1) where the
shareholders form the corporation for "some illegal, fraudulent, or unjust
purpose;" or (2) where the officers or shareholders ignore the corporate
form and use it as a mere instrument to conduct their affairs ("alter ego"
theory).49 In these circumstances, both the corporation and its officers
and shareholders (or subsidiary and the parent corporation) can be liable
for the corporation's (or subsidiary's) wrongful conduct.50
Because this Note is not concerned with corporations formed for an
illegal or fraudulent purpose, "alter ego" is the relevant theory for piercing
the corporate veil under CERCLA.51 The rationale of alter ego theory of
liability is that if shareholders disregard the legal separation, unique
properties or proper formalities between the different corporate entities,
then the law will disregard them as well to protect both individual and cor-
porate creditors.52 Under this theory, courts generally apply a two-prong
test, requiring that: (1) there is such unity of interest and ownership that
the separate personalities of the corporation and individual no longer ex-
ist; and (2) adhering to the doctrine of the separate corporate entity would
lead to an unjust result.
53
Under the first prong, the critical inquiry is whether the parent corpo-
ration controlled or dominated the subsidiary which committed the wrong-
ful acts. 54 In determining whether this control or domination rose to a
48 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 37, § 41.
49 Id. at § 41.10, at 615 ("The doctrine of alter ego fastens liability on the individual who uses
a corporation merely as an instrumentality to conduct his or her own personal business, and such
liability arises from fraud or injustice perpetrated no on the corporation but on third persons
dealing with the corporation."), quoted in Oswald & Schipani, supra note 4, at 296 n.206.
50 In this discussion, a parent corporation is a shareholder of the corporation; hence, one
may use the terms "shareholder" and "parent corporation" interchangeably.
51 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 37, § 41.10. The alter ego is also commonly referred to a the
"business conduit" or "mere instrumentality" theory of piercing the corporate veil. Id.
52 IA
53 1&; see also Oswald & Schipani, supra note 4, at 296; Dennis, supra note 4, at 1436-39;
Wallace, supra note 4, at 877.
54 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 37, § 41.10, at 616 (stating that the first prong requires "control,
not merely majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of the fi-
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level warranting piercing the corporate veil, courts evaluate several factors
including, but not limited to, whether: (1) the shareholder owns most or
all of the stock; (2) the shareholder subscribed to all or most of the corpo-
ration's capital stock or otherwise caused its incorporation; (3) the corpo-
ration is under-capitalized; (4) the shareholder uses the corporation's
property as his own; (5) the corporation's officers or directors act indepen-
dently in the interest of the corporation or simply take their orders from
the shareholder; and (6) the corporation observes the legal formalities of
the corporate form.55 Because none of the factors by themselves is deter-
minative, courts typically examine the totality of the circumstances. 56
One should note two important features of piercing the corporate veil:
First, when courts pierce the corporate veil to impose indirect liability on a
corporate officer, the corporate officer is almost always a shareholder in
the corporation.57 This is due to the unity of interest and control require-
ment in the first prong of the alter ego test. Ownership, particularly major-
ity ownership, goes a long way to satisfying this requirement. Second,
courts are much more likely to pierce the corporate veil of a closely held
corporation than of a publicly held corporation.58 In closely held corpora-
tions, shareholders are often the corporation's officers and directors. As
the separateness between the corporation's management and shareholders
becomes more blurred, courts find it easier to disregard the corporate
entity.
IV. DIRECT LIABILITY AS AN ARRANGER AND DIVERGENT VIEWS OF THE
CIRCUITS
A. Arranger Liability Under CERCLA § 107(a)(3)
CERCLA § 107(a) (3) provides arranger liability for "any person who
by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or
arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of haz-
ardous substances."59 While the statute also defines the terms "hazardous
nances, but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction so that the corporate
entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own"), cited in
Oswald & Schipani, supra note 4, at 297 n.208.
55 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 37, § 41.10, at 616; see also United States v. Jon-T Chemicals,
Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691-92 (5th Cir. 1985) (listing 12 factors to evaluate when determining
whether to pierce the corporate veil of a parent corporation; Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 4, at
432-38 (listing factors state courts in California evaluate for piercing the corporate veil); O'Hara,
supra note 4, at 3-4 (listing factors to evaluate for piercing the corporate veil).
56 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 37, § 41.10, at 616 (stating that "no one talismanic fact will
justify piercing the corporate veil with impunity"), quoted in Oswald & Schipani, supra note 4, at
804 n.234.
57 See Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 97 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (in holding that formal
ownership of stock in a corporation is not necessary to pierce the corporate veil, the court stated
that "[t]he question is one of control, not merely paper ownership"); 1 W. FLTCHER, supra note
37, § 41.10, at 615 ("The question of control is determined by actual, substantial relationship of
the parties; the mere existence or nonexistence of formal stock ownership is not necessarily con-
clusive.") (citing Labadie Coal Co., 672 F.2d at 97); Wallace, supra note 4, at 857 (stating that
"[g]enerally control is basic to most piercing cases").
58 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 37, § 25, at 514.
59 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
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substance" 60 and "facility,"'6 ' it does not define the phrase "otherwise ar-
ranged for." This lack of a statutory definition has led to a great amount of
litigation: determining which parties "otherwise arranged for" the treat-
ment or disposal of the hazardous substances determines who can be po-
tentially liable as an arranger.62
Notably, the statute includes both individuals and corporations in its
definition of "person."63 Some courts and commentators argue that,
although the statute includes corporations in its definition of a "person"
subject to liability, a court may only impose liability on shareholders and
parent corporations through the common law theory of piercing the cor-
porate veil. 64 Other courts, relying on the fact that CERCLA includes cor-
porations in its definition of "persons" who may be liable, hold that
shareholders and parent corporations may be directly liable as arrangers
because of their subsidiary's actions if they sufficiently control the subsidi-
ary. These courts focus their inquiry on the amount of control exerted by
the parent corporation over the subsidiary's operations that led to the
CERCLA violation. 6
5
Professors Oswald and Schipani concluded that whether holding of-
ficers directly or indirectly liable, courts ultimately found that the share-
holder or parent corporation had to exert "substantial control" over the
particular activities that led to the CERCLA violation.
66
B. Divergent Views of the Circuits
The courts of appeals have not uniformly agreed upon the proper
legal standard for imposing direct liability on parties as arrangers under
CERCLA § 107(a) (3).67 Some courts use the "actual participation" test
that requires the parent corporation to actually participate in the subsidi-
ary's activities that led to the disposal of hazardous subtances. 68 One court
applied traditional corporate law doctrine and held that a parent corpora-
tion could not be directly liable for its subsidiary's hazardous waste disposal
activities-to reach the parent, the plaintiff must assert facts that warrant
piercing the corporate veil. 69 In contrast, other courts use the "authority to
control" test that only requires the parent corporation to exert some type
60 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
61 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
62 See infra Part IV.B.
63 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
64 See, e.g., Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T. L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a
parent corporation cannot be directly liable under CERCLA § 107(a) for the disposal activities of
its subsidiaries, but may only be liable through traditional common law doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil) (for a more detailed discussion of Joslyn, see infra notes 80-84); see also Wallace,
supra note 4.
65 See supra note 5.
66 Oswald & Schipani, supra note 4, at 308.
67 When imposing direct liability on corporate officers and parent corporations, some courts
find a significant difference between the standards for "operator" liability under CERCLA
§ 107(a) (2) and arranger liability under § 107(a) (3). See, e.g., United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68
F.3d 1082, 1091 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that "the statutory requirements for each of these two
classifications under CERCLA are significantly different").
68 See infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
69 See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
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of control over the subsidiary's general activities,70 while another merely
required the party to have an "obligation to control" the hazardous waste
disposal activities.7 ' These inconsistent standards for corporate officer and
shareholder liability as arrangers unduly complicate matters for parties in-
volved in generating or treating hazardous substances, and create the po-
tential for unpredictable and questionable holdings in the future.
1. Actual Participation
In Amcast Industrial Corp. v. Detrex Corp.,72 the Seventh Circuit held that
a shipper of a useful product containing a hazardous substance is not "ar-
ranging for" disposal or treatment of hazardous wastes and is therefore not
an arranger under CERCLA § 107(a) (3).73 In Amcast, the plaintiff, a man-
ufacturer of copper fittings, used TCE, a hazardous substance, in its manu-
facturing process. Plaintiff purchased some of the TCE from the
defendant. The defendant either delivered the TCE to the plaintiff itself
or defendant contracted with a local transporter to deliver the chemicals.
Over 800 gallons of TCE were found in the groundwater beneath the plain-
tiff's pharmaceutical plant. Evidence showed that both the defendant's
and the transporter's drivers sometimes accidentally spilled the TCE on the
plaintiff's premises while filling the plaintiffs storage tanks. Having spent
more than one million dollars on remediation of the site, the plaintiff sued
the defendant chemical manufacturer for contribution, alleging that the
defendant was responsible for both the chemical spilled from its own
trucks, and for the chemical spilled from the transporter's trucks because
the defendant "arranged for" the transportation and delivery of the
chemicals.
First, the Seventh Circuit found the defendant liable for the chemicals
spilled from its own trucks because statute defines disposal to include spill-
ing.74 Next, the court addressed whether the defendant "arranged for" the
disposal of the chemicals by contracting with a transporter to deliver the
chemicals to the pharmaceutical plant. The court of appeals interpreted
the statutory language to determine the meaning of "arranged for," and
held that "the critical words for present purposes are 'arranged for.' The
words imply intentional action."75 Hence, the Seventh Circuit requires a
party to "intentionally" arrange for the disposal or treatment of hazardous
waste to be an arranger under CERCLA. From Amcast, one can infer that
the Seventh Circuit would require a potentially responsible party to actively
participate in a corporation's hazardous waste disposal activities before im-
posing direct liability on the party. 76
70 See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
71 See infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
72 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993).
73 Amcast 2 F.3d at 751.
74 Id. at 750.
75 Id at 751.
76 Cf. United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d 1082, 1086-87 (8th Cir. 1995) (defendant
unsuccessfully argued that the appropriate standard was actual participation).
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In Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co.,7 7 the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's holding that suppliers of chemicals to a
wood treatment facility were not liable as arrangers.7 8 The district court
found that a mere sale of substances by suppliers for use in the wood treat-
ment process did not constitute "arranging for" disposal of hazardous sub-
stance, even when process runoff containing hazardous substances was
located at the same site.
79
2. Piercing the Corporate Veil
In Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T. L. James & Co.,80 the Fifth Circuit held
that a parent corporation cannot be directly liable as an owner or operator
under CERCLA § 107(a) (2) for the disposal activities of its subsidiaries but
may only be indirectly liable through the traditional common law doctrine
of piercing the corporate veil.8 1 In holding that the statutory language of
CERCLA did not warrant altering "so substantially a basic tenet of corpora-
tion law," the court stated that "[i]f Congress wanted to extend liability to
parent corporations it could have done so, and it remains free to do so."82
The court agreed with the Seventh Circuit's statutory interpretation of the
limits of CERCLA's liability reach: "To the point that courts could achieve
'more' of the legislative objectives by adding to the lists of those responsi-
ble, it is enough to respond that statutes have not only ends but also
limits."8 3
Next, the Fifth Circuit applied traditional rules of corporate law to
determine whether to impose liability on the parent corporation by pierc-
ing the corporate veil. Using the alter ego test, the Fifth Circuit evaluated a
laundry list of factors and determined that piercing the corporate veil was
not appropriate.
8 4
77 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
78 L at 156 (while implicitly finding arranger liability under CERCLA § 107(a) (3) inapplica-
ble, the court stated that the defendant's "potential liability arises, if at all, under § 107(a) (2)").
79 Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651, 654-56 (N.D. Ill.
1988); see also United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1995). In GurLey, the court held that
an individual employee of the corporation could only be liable as an operator under CERCLA
§ 107(a) (2) if the employee (1) had the authority to make hazardous waste disposal decisions,
and (2) actually exercised that authority by personally participating in the hazardous waste dispo-
sal activities by either personally performing the tasks, or directing others to do so. Although in
the context of owner or operator liability under CERCLA § 107(a) (2), this case clearly requires
the party to actively participate in the corporation's CERCLA violation before imposing liability
on that party.
80 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).
81 See Riverside Market Dev. Corp. v. International Bldg. Prods., Inc., 931 F.2d 327 (5th Cir.
1991). In Riverside Market, the court announced that the more liberal "participation" standard
applied to "operator" liability for corporate officers under CERCA § 107(a) (2). The "participa-
tion" standard implicitly accepts that the corporate officer may be directly liable where the corpo-
rate officer personally participates in the corporation's wrongful conduct. The court stated that,
"[W] e must look to the extent of the defendant's personal participation in the alleged wrongful
conduct.... Corporate officers are liable for their torts, although committed when acting offi-
cially." Id. at 330 (citing 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 37, § 1135, at 290).
82 Joslyn, 893 F.2d at 83.
83 Ia (quoting Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157 (7th
Cir. 1988)).
84 Id. at 83-84.
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Admittedly, this case specifically addressed parent corporation direct
liability as an owner or operator under CERCLA § 107(a) (2). However,
the strong language used by the court clearly indicates that the Fifth Cir-
cuit would find that direct liability as an arranger under CERCLA
§ 107(a) (3) would not reach shareholders and parent corporations, and
imposing indirect liability on shareholders and parent corporations for a
corporation's (or subsidiary's) CERCLA violations is only appropriate when
piercing the corporate veil.
3. Authority to Control
In United States v. Vertac Chemical Corp.,85 the Eighth Circuit held that
the mere authority to control hazardous waste activities does not, by itself,
warrant imposing direct arranger liability.86 In Vertac, the United States
and the state of Arkansas brought a recovery action against several parties
including a government contractor who produced defoliant for wartime
use. The appellant argued that the United States should be liable both as
an operator under § 107(a) (2) and as arranger under § 107(a) (3) due to
the government's regulatory authority over production of the defoliant.
First, the circuit court distinguished the issue in Vertac from its earlier
holding in United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.
(NEPACCO). 87 In NEPACCO, the Eighth Circuit, in the context of "owner
or operator" liability under CERCLA § 107(a) (2), determined that the ap-
propriate test for determining whether a person "owned" the hazardous
waste in question is whether the person had "the authority to control the
handling and disposal of hazardous substances."8 8 Although the Eighth
Circuit was ultimately determining whether to impose liability upon the
corporate officer as an arranger under CERCLA § 107(a) (3), the "author-
ity to control" test was applied to determine whether the corporate officer
"owned" the hazardous waste within the definition of the statute. Unfortu-
nately, several courts took the "authority to control" language in NEPACCO
out of context.8 9
In Vertac, the Eighth Circuit did not make this error. Accordingly, the
court stated that "[o]ur holding in NEPACCO, when read in the context of
the facts of the case, certainly does not suggest such a broad interpreta-
tion."90 The court then held that mere authority to control hazardous
waste activities does not, by itself, warrant imposing arranger liability;
hence, the United States was not liable as an arranger.91
85 46 F.3d 803 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2609 (1995).
86 Id. at 810.
87 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
88 Id. at 743.
89 See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a stock-
holder who manages the corporation is liable under GERCLA as an "owner or operator") (citing
NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823, 847-48 (W.D. Mo. 1984)); United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699, 20,700 (D.S.C.June 15, 1984) (citing NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823).
For a criticism of the authority to control standard in these cases, see Wallace, supra note 4, at
851-55.
90 VerWta 46 F.3d at 810.
91 Id. at 810.
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4. Mere Sale of a Useful Product
In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp.,92 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that manufacturers of transformers containing hazardous sub-
stances were not liable as arrangers under CERCLA § 107(a) (3). In Florida
Power & Light, the plaintiff power company (FP & L) purchased transform-
ers from the defendant manufacturers. After using the transformers in
their business for approximately forty years, FP & L sold them as scrap to a
company that salvaged the transformers for metals and oil. The plaintiffs
alleged that the manufacturer, with knowledge that transformers contained
hazardous waste, arranged for the disposal of hazardous waste by selling
transformers and were thus liable as arrangers.93 First, the court cited
NEPACCO for the general proposition that a court should give a liberal
interpretation of the term "arranged" to achieve "CERCLA's overwhelm-
ingly remedial statutory scheme."94 Next, in finding that the defendant
manufacturer was not directly liable as an arranger, the court declared that
arranger liability does not attach where the "party merely sells a product."95
The court reasoned that a manufacturer could be liable as an arranger
even though he does not make the "critical decisions" as to disposal. How-
ever, the court did not explain when and under what circumstances a man-
ufacturer would be liable for "arranging for" disposal of a hazardous
substance. 96 The court found that the transaction was a "mere sale," and
thus the manufacturers were not liable as arrangers under CERCLA
§ 107(a) (3).97
In a similar situation, the Eighth Circuit found that where a manufac-
turer contracts with a another party to process a product, and this process
inherently produces hazardous substances that must be disposed of, the
manufacturer has arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances. In
United States v. Aceto Agriculture Chemicals Corp.,98 the defendant pesticide
manufacturer contracted to have another party formulate technical grade
pesticides. The pesticide formulation process generated hazardous wastes.
The court distinguished this from the sale of a useful product in several
manners. First, because the process generated hazardous substances that
would require disposal, it was a disposal of hazardous substance, not incor-
poration of a hazardous substance for sale as a useful product.99 Moreover,
unlike the sale of transformers in FP & L, the contracting party in Aceto
performed a process on a product that was wholly owned by the manufac-
turer, for the manufacturer's benefit, and the disposal of hazardous sub-
stances was contemporaneous with the process. 100 The court reasoned that
92 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990).
93 Id- at 1316.
94 Id. at 1317 (citing NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 733).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1318.
97 Id. at 1319.
98 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
99 Id at 1381.
100 Id
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not finding liability in this situation would allow defendants to "close their
eyes" to the method of disposal of their hazardous substances.101
5. Obligation to Control
The Second Circuit, in General Electric v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc.,
10 2
held that oil companies were not "arrangers" for their service station ten-
ants' waste disposal, even if the companies had the ability or opportunity to
control the disposal and exercised control over certain aspects of their ten-
ants' business.10 3 In GeneralElectric, defendant oil companies leased service
stations to dealers. The dealers subsequently collected, stored and ulti-
mately disposed of the waste motor oil at a hazardous waste dumpsite. The
plaintiff, seeking contribution for its remediation costs, alleged that the
defendant oil companies "arranged for" the disposal or treatment of haz-
ardous substances because the parties had the "opportunity or authority to
control" the location or method of disposal.
10 4
The court found that while arranger liability could extend "to parties
that do not have active involvement regarding the timing, manner or loca-
tion of disposal,"10 5 there must be a nexus between the defendant and the
disposal of hazardous substances. The court defined this nexus as "the ob-
ligation to exercise control over the hazardous substances, and not the
mere ability or opportunity to control the disposal."' 06 In highlighting that
the standard for arranger liability is different from "operator" liability, the
court noted that courts refused to find arranger liability where a party
merely "knew about the nature of the facility's operations and had 'the
power to get involved in actual management' of the facility."
10 7
Thus, the several circuit courts that have addressed the issue of direct
liability as an arranger under CERCLA § 107(a) (3) have struggled to artic-
ulate a standard that is consistent with both CERCLA's broad scope of lia-
bility and the limited liability provided to nonparticipating corporate
officers and shareholders. It seems clear that the mere sale of a product
that contains hazardous substances is not arranging for treatment or dispo-
sal of a hazardous waste. However, when applying this standard, the Elev-
enth Circuit stated that a manufacturer could be directly liable as an
arranger without making the hazardous substance treatment or disposal
decisions, but the court did not articulate under what circumstances. 08
Beyond that, the rules of liability are blurred. The Seventh Circuit an-
nounced a standard that appears to require the party to actually participate
in the hazardous waste disposal activities of the corporation. 10 9 Similarly,
101 Id. at 1382.
102 962 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1992).
103 I& at 287-88.
104 Id. at 283.
105 Id. at 286 (quoting CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1279 (W.D.
Mich. 1991)).
106 Id.
107 Id. at 287 (quoting Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 781 F. Supp. 1454,
1457 (N.D. Cal. 1991)).
108 See supra notes 92-97.
109 See supra notes 72-76.
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the Fifth Circuit strictly applied traditional corporate law doctrine and held
that a parent corporation could not be directly liable for its subsidiary's
hazardous waste disposal activities-to reach the parent, the plaintiff must
assert facts that warrant piercing the corporate veil.110 The Second Circuit
found that imposing direct arranger liability merely required the party to
have an obligation to control the corporation's hazardous substance activi-
ties. In contrast, the Eighth Circuit found that the mere authority to con-
trol the hazardous disposal activities, by itself, did not make a party liable as
an arranger. However, the Eighth Circuit did not enumerate what activity
would justify imposing direct liability on a party as an arranger.
V. UNITED STATFS V. TIC Zi~l'STMEVT CORP.
A. The Factual Background"'
White Farm Equipment Company (WFE) was a wholly owned subsidi-
ary of TIC Investment Corporation, Inc. (TIC).112 WFE owned and oper-
ated a farm implement manufacturing plant located in Charles City, Iowa
from 1971 through 1985. During the manufacturing, WFE produced foun-
dry sand and ash that required disposal"1 3 WFE contracted with a local
corporation'1 4 to transport and dispose WFE's hazardous waste at a local
dumpsite."1 5
In 1979, WFE agreed to lease the dumpsite from the local corporation
for two years for a nominal fee. Neither WFE's corporate officer (Mr. Ge-
orgoulis) nor its parent corporation (TIC) were involved with AWE before
or at the time the parties signed the lease. After the lease expired, WFE
did not renew the lease, yet it continued to transport and dispose its haz-
ardous waste at the dumpsite.
In December 1980, White Farm U.S.A., Inc., an investment holding
company, bought all of WFE's stock, and was thus the sole shareholder.
11 6
From December 1980 through October 1985, White Farm U.S.A. wholly
owned WFE, and White Farm Industries, Inc. in turn wholly owned White
Farm U.S.A. From 1980 through 1985, TIC wholly owned White Farm In-
dustries. Thus, in essence, TIC was WEE's parent corporation. The de-
fendant corporate officer in the case, Mr. Georgoulis, was the sole
shareholder of TIC when TIC was the parent corporation of WFE.1 7 From
110 See supra notes 80-84.
111 United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 1995). The facts are taken from the
district court's summary of facts. United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 866 F. Supp. 1173, 1175-77
(N.D. Iowa 1994).
112 There were several holding companies that began with the name TIC. Hereinafter, all of
these corporations are referred to as TIC.
113 The waste foundry sand and ash contained lead, cadmium, and chromium, all of which
are hazardous substances under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). TIC, 866 F. Supp. at 1175.
114 The local corporation was H.E. Construction Co. (HEC). Id.
115 The dumpsite was basically farmland owned by Homer Blickenderfer. Id.
116 White Farm U.S.. purchased the stock from White Motor Corporation pursuant to an
order from a United States Bankruptcy Court. Id.
117 Georgoulis was president of the following: WFE from December 19, 1980 to November 23,
1981; TIC Services, Co. and TICI from May 1980 to March 1985, and TICU from the time it was
formed through March 1985. From May 1, 1980 through March 27, 1985, Georgoulis was the
Chairman of the following corporations' corporate boards: WFE, White Farm U.SA, White
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December 1980 until Borg-Warner Acceptance Corporation (BWAG) refi-
nanced WFE in 1983, WFE's corporate board only consisted of two people,
and Georgoulis, the chairman, was one of them. Under the refinancing
agreement, BWAC required WIFE to expand its board to five members. Ge-
orgoulis remained on the board through March 1985.118
There was no evidence that Georgoulis or any other employee of TIC
had any personal knowledge of WFE's waste disposal practices or that they
participated in any way with the waste disposal decisions of any of the sub-
sidiary corporations.
In May 1985, WFE defaulted on its loan agreement with BWAC. Be-
cause BWAG was the priority lienholder of WFE's assets, BWAC became the
owner of all WFE assets at the time. Shortly thereafter, in October 1985,
BWAC sold all of WEE's assets to one of the plaintiffs, Allied.
In 1988, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
placed the dumpsite on the National Priorities List and began remediation
activities at the dumpsite." 9 Both the EPA and Allied incurred response
costs while conducting remediation activities.
Allied and the United States brought separate actions under CERCLA
§ 107 against Georgoulis and TIC to recover their response costs. The
plaintiffs alleged that Georgoulis (as a corporate officer and director) and
TIC (as a parent corporation) were directly liable under CERCLA
§ 107(a) (3) as arrangers, and derivatively liable by piercing the corporate
veil.' 20 Allied moved for summaryjudgment. Likewise, defendants made a
cross motion for summary judgment.
B. The District Court Opinion
1. Owner-Operator Liability
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' request for summary judg-
ment on the claim that the defendants' "owned or operated" the dumpsite
through WFE's lease of the dumpsite. First, the court noted that, when
addressing lessee liability as an "owner-operator," a court should look at
"how much control over and responsibility for the use of the site the lessor
maintains." 121 The district court found that although the lease maintained
Farm Industries, Inc., TIC Services Co., TICI and TICU. Hence, with respect to TICU, Georgou-
lis was the President and Chairman of the Board of TICU from the time it was formed through
March 1985. TIC, 68 F.3d at 1084-85.
118 Id.
119 See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (8) (B); 40 C.F.R. Part 800, App. B (1993).
120 The EPA only asked for summary judgment in relation to the claim of derivative liability.
In addition to arranger liability under § 107(a) (3), Allied also asserted both direct and derivative
liability under § 107(a) (2) as "owner-operators." Allied asked for summary judgment under both
"arranger" and "owner-operators" theories of liability.
121 TIC, 866 F. Supp. at 1178 (citing Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d
837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992); Pierson Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Pierson Township., 851 F. Supp. 850
(W.D. Mich. 1994); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984,
1003 (D.S.C. 1984), rev'd inpart on other grounds, United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th
Cir. 1988)). The court also noted that courts finding lessees liable as owner-operators focused on
the fact that the lessees' activities directly caused the release of a hazardous substance. TIC, 866
F. Supp. at 1178 (citing United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., Inc., 980 F.2d 478, 484 (8th Cir.
1992) (owner and operator of leaking oil tanks located on leased land was an "owner-operator"
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
that lessor retained complete control over the dumpsite, there was suffi-
cient evidence suggesting that WFE did, in fact, exert some control. Be-
cause there was a genuine issue of material fact, the court found summary
judgment on this issue inappropriate. 22
2. Arranger Liability and Corporate Officers
CERCLA § 107(a) (3) imposes strict liability upon "any person" who
"by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal.., of hazard-
ous substances .... 1123 The statute includes both individuals and corpora-
tions within its definition of "person." 24 The district court noted,
however, that "arranged for" is not defined in the statute. Hence, the is-
sues for the district court were first to define "arranged for" within the
meaning and intent of the statute, and second, to determine whether the
defendants' actions satisfied that meaning. 25
The plaintiffs asserted that the proper standard for arranger liability
was the authority to control test described in the Eighth Circuit's opinion
in United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co. (NEPACCO).126
In contrast, the defendants asserted that the authority to control test was
too liberal an interpretation of "otherwise arranged for" under CERCLA.
The defendants further argued that the "actual participation" test was the
appropriate standard; therefore, since they did not participate in the cor-
poration's hazardous waste disposal activities, it followed that they could
not be directly liable under the statute. 27
Relying on NEPACCO and cases from other circuits, the district court
held that the proper standard for determining corporate officer liability as
an arranger under § 107(a) (3) was the authority to control test used in
determining owner-operator liability under § 107(a) (2).128 In addition,
the court required a "showing that the defendant actually exercised his or
her authority" to control the corporation's operations. 129 Alluding to both
under CERCLA); Weyerhaeuser Corp. v. Koppers Co., 771 F. Supp. 1406 (D. Md. 1991) (lessee of
wood treatment plant liable as owner-operator)). For a detailed discussion of owner-operator
liability under CERCLA, see citations supra note 4.
122 TIC, 866 F. Supp. at 1178.
123 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3), quoted in TIC, 866 F. Supp. at 1178.
124 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21): "The term 'person' means an individual, firm, corporation, associa-
tion, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State,
municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." Id.
125 TIC, 866 F. Supp. at 1177.
126 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986).
127 TIC, 866 F. Supp. at 1178.
128 Id at 1179. The court gave two reasons when explaining its rationale for applying the
"authority to control" test for "arranger" liability:
[T]o hold that liability should be determined differently depending on whether the
corporation disposed of waste on its own facility or at a facility off the corporation's
property would open a large gap in CERCLA legislation allowing corporate officers to
escape liability merely by shipping its hazardous waste offsite. Moreover, the authority
to control test is appropriate for arranger liability as to hold otherwise would encourage
persons in authority to turn a blind eye to the method of disposal of their corporation's
hazardous substances. This would contravene the underlying policy of CERCLA.
Id. (citing United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1382 (8th Cir. 1989)).
129 Id. at 1180, quoted in United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.2d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 1995).
The court rebuffed the defendant's argument that the plaintiff must prove that the corporate
officer exercised "actual control" over the daily operations of the corporation. The court noted
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public policy and legislative intent, the court explained the rationale be-
hind its "actual exercise of control" test for arranger liability:
The necessity for showing that the defendant actually exercised his or her
authority is to establish that the defendant was not a mere figurehead,
and that he or she played more than a passive role in the corporation.
Whether an individual chooses to exercise all the authority he or she has
over a corporation is not relevant under the statutory scheme as one pur-
pose of CERCLA is to encourage those individuals with the power to do
so, to take action to abate the damage caused by hazardous waste dispo-
sal. To allow those in authority to escape liability because they chose to
oversee certain aspects of their corporation, yet ignore hazardous waste
disposal practices, would defeat the purpose behind the legislation.' 30
After reviewing all of the evidence of Georgoulis's involvement in WFE's
operations, the court determined that he was neither "a mere figurehead
of WEE [n]or a passive stockholder."1'3 Although there was no evidence
that Georgoulis had any personal knowledge of WEE's waste disposal activi-
ties, the district court concluded that "[due] to Georgoulis' authority to
control WEE and his actual exercise of control over WEE, he is directly
liable as an arranger under CERCLA."'132
Because the court found Georgoulis directly liable as an arranger, it
did not evaluate whether he could be derivatively liable as an arranger on
the common law theory of "piercing the corporate veil."
133
3. Arranger Liability and Parent Corporations
In analyzing arranger liability for parent corporations, the district
court rejected the authority to control test because such authority is "inher-
ent" in the parent-subsidiary relationship. 34 The court then held that, like
corporate officers, parent corporations may be directly liable as arrangers
under § 107(a) (3) if the parent corporations have "gone beyond an invest-
ment relationship with the subsidiary and [have] exerted actual control
over the subsidiary's activities."' 35 Therefore, the district court was consis-
tent and made the test for direct liability as an arranger under 107(a) (3)
the same for both corporate officers and parent corporations: "actual
control."'3
6
that several courts, in finding "operator" liability, found that the corporate officer did not have to
exercise "actual control" over the daily operations of the corporation. TIC, 866 F. Supp. at 1180
(citing Donahey v. Bogle, 987 F.2d 1250, 1254 (6th Cir. 1993) (sole shareholder of a company
that disposed of its hazardous waste at one of the company's leased facilities was liable as an
"operator" notwithstanding the fact that the shareholder did not actively participate in the corpo-
ration's day-to-day activities)); Pierson Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Pierson Township, 851 F. Supp. 850,
855 (W.D. Mich. 1994) ("authority to control" a landfill is sufficient for "operator" liability, and
there is no need to prove day-to-day management).
130 TIC, 866 F. Supp. at 1180-81 (citations omitted).
131 Id. at 1181.
132 Id., quoted in TIC, 68 F.3d at 1086.
133 TIC, 866 F. Supp. at 1181.
134 Id. at 1182.
135 Id., quoted in TIC, 68 F.3d at 1091.
136 For a discussion of direct liability as an arranger under § 107(a) (3) for corporate officers,
see supra notes 123-36 and accompanying text.
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The rationale for applying the actual control test to find direct liability
for parent corporations as arrangers under § 107(a) (3) was two-fold: (1)
to discourage "active" parent corporations from ignoring the hazardous
waste disposal practices of its subsidiaries; 137 and (2) to recognize that a
parent corporation's involvement in "seemingly unrelated" areas may di-
rectly affect waste disposal practices of the subsidiary.' 38
The court then explained that determining whether a parent corpora-
tion exerted enough actual control to warrant arranger liability would be a
fact specific, "case-by-case" inquiry. 3 9 After reviewing the facts and corre-
sponding determinations of parent corporation liability by other courts, 140
the district court listed the instances of TIC's involvement in WFE's af-
fairs.' 41 Despite the absence of evidence showing that TIC participated in
the subsidiary's waste disposal activities or decisions, the court found TIC's
level of active involvement in WFE's affairs sufficient to find them directly
liable as arrangers under § 107(a) (3).142 Because the court found direct
liability, it did not consider indirect liability under § 107(a) (3).1 4 3
137 TIC, 866 F. Supp. at 1182.
138 Id. The court explained that where a parent corporation makes budgetary or cost cutting
demands directed at the subsidiary, the subsidiary may feel either compelled to make savings in
the hazardous waste disposal area where the costs are relatively high, or constrained from making
improvements in the existing waste disposal system. Id. at 1182 n.5.
139 Id. at 1182.
140 Id. at 1182-83 (citing Lansford-Coaldale Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1223-24
(3d Cir. 1993) (appellate court did not affirm, and remanded for further findings, district court's
determination that the parent was not liable as an "operator"; appellate court found it significant
that the companies shared common officers, common officers reported to the shared president,
and the shared president had final decision making authority over operation and management of
the two companies); Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bermuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir.
1993) (no liability as an "operator" where the parent corporation's involvement limited to dictat-
ing the terms of employment for subsidiary, owning 100% of subsidiary's stock, hiring and creat-
ing profit sharing plan for the subsidiary's executive officers, receiving dividend distributions
totaling more than the subsidiary's net earnings, and receiving the subsidiary's status reports);
John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401, 407 (1st Cir. 1993) (parent holding company
directly liable as "operator" of its subsidiary utility companies where parent president was also
president of subsidiary, appointed by the parent, and reported to the parent); United States v.
Kayser-Roth Corp., Inc., 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990) (parent corporation liable where parent had
total monetary control over the subsidiary, placed restrictions on subsidiary's budget, required
subsidiary to funnel all government and real estate transactions through the parent, and filled
nearly all of the subsidiary's executive positions); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General, Inc., 777 F.
Supp. 549, 575 (W.D. Mich. 1991) ("operator" liability found where parent had full ownership of
subsidiary, sometimes controlled the subsidiary's board, was involved in daily operations through
parent officials who served in positions within the subsidiary, was active in policy making and
control over the subsidiary's environmental matters and labor problems, and exerted financial
control over the subsidiary's budget and major capital expenditures)).
141 The court listed numerous facts including Georgoulis's involvement as president and
chairman of the board of directors for both TICI and TICU; TICI and TICU's involvement in
lowering personnel and labor costs; Georgoulis's maintaining final authority over WFE's man-
power and staffing; and TIC owned, through various holding companies, 100% of WFE's stock.
TIC, 866 F. Supp. at 1183-84.
142 Id. at 1184. The court also stated that it would, alternatively, find arranger liability for
both Georgoulis and TIC under the "sufficient nexus" theory. Under this theory, a person is
liable "if there is a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the complained of hazardous
substance." Id. at 1184 n.8. This would include liability both where the defendant is active in
hazardous waste disposal decisions, and where the defendant had an obligation to control the
hazardous substances. Id. (citing General Electric Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d
281, 286 (2d Cir. 1992); and United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 821 F. Supp. 707, 724 (S.D. Ga.
1993)).
143 TIC, 866 F. Supp. at 1184.
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C. The Eighth Circuit Opinion
1. Arranger Liability and Corporate Officers
In United States v. TIC Investment Corp.,14 a three judge panel from the
Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's opinion and announced that
the proper standard for determining arranger liability for corporate of-
ficers "imposes direct arranger liability on a corporate officer or director if
he or she had the authority to control and did in fact exercise actual or
substantial control, directly or indirectly, over the arrangement for disposal,
or the off-site disposal, of hazardous substances." 145 Applying this standard
to the facts of the case, the court concluded that Georgoulis was directly
liable as an arranger under § 107(a) (3) because "he exercised substantial
indirect control over the disposal arrangement."'
46
The standard for direct arranger liability for corporate officers an-
nounced by the Eighth Circuit departs from the district court's decision in
a significant manner. Both courts require the corporate officer to exercise
actual control over the corporation; however, the court of appeals standard
also includes a causation requirement between the exercise of control and
the arrangement for disposal of the hazardous substances. 147 The district
court standard merely required that the corporate officer have authority to
control, and actually exercise that authority, over the corporation's opera-
tions; it did not require a nexus with the corporation's hazardous waste
disposal activities. In contrast, the court of appeals expressly required that
the exercise of control have a nexus with the corporation's hazardous waste
disposal activities. The court reasoned that "[t]he language of CERCLA's
arranger subsection specifically requires that one arrange for disposal or
treatment, or arrange for transportation for disposal or treatment."
48
The Eighth Circuit rejected the defendants' argument that direct lia-
bility as an arranger requires that the party "take... some intentional ac-
tion to arrange for disposal of a hazardous substance."' 49 In doing so, the
court explained its interpretation of Congress's broad liability scheme
under CERCLA.' 5 0 The court then explained that its earlier holding in
Aceto, where it found arranger liability for defendants who contracted to
144 68 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 1995).
145 Id. at 1088.
146 Id. at 1090 (emphasis added). The court summarized Georgoulis's activities:
[T]he undisputed facts show that Georgoulis had the authority to control virtually every
aspect of WFE's operations and indirectly control others. We find it beyond dispute that
Georgoulis, in his capacity as board chairman and chief executive officer of WFE, so
usurped the power of those who were only nominally running WFE that he undertook
responsibility for all of WFE's decisionmaking- he so tightly controlled WIFE, particularly
its budgetary aspects, that he left WIFE employees no other choice but to continue with
the relatively inexpensive arrangement that had historically existed between WIFE and
HEC. In other words, Georgoulis's actions inexorably led to the continuation of the
disposal of WFE's wastes at the dumpsite.
d. at 1090.
147 IA at 1090 n.7.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 1087 (citing Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.Sd 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1993),
cited in Brief for Appellants at 9).
150 Id. at 1088 (stating that Congress's goals were "(1) to ensure that those responsible for the
problems caused by hazardous wastes are required to pay for the clean-up costs.., and (2) to
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have another party "formulate" rather than "dispose of" defendants' pesti-
cides containing hazardous wastes' 51 "implicitly rejected a specific intent
requirement." 1
52
Next, the court of appeals distinguished its recent holding in United
States v. Gurley'W 5 from the facts in this case. Gur/ey dealt with operator lia-
bility of a "mere employee," whereas TIC involved the actions of a corpo-
rate officer. In Gurley, the court found an employee liable as an operator
because the employee "(1) had the authority to determine whether hazard-
ous waste would be disposed of and the method of disposal and (2) actually
exercised that authority, either by personally performing the tasks neces-
sary to dispose of the hazardous wastes or by directing others to perform
those tasks."' 54 In TIC, the court limited the holding in Gur/ey by distin-
guishing between employees and corporate officers, directors or sharehold-
ers because "officers, directors, or shareholders are more likely to cause a
company to dispose of hazardous waste."
155
The Eighth Circuit explained that the public policy rationale for find-
ing a more liberal liability scheme for corporate officers was to close a loop-
hole for officers who in fact controlled practically every aspect of a
corporation's activities, even though there was no proof of personal in-
volvement in the arrangement for disposal. The court determined the
loophole existed where
[a] corporate officer, who has virtually unlimited control over a company
and in fact exercises that control but knows well enough to close his or
her eyes to the specific details of the company's hazardous waste disposal
practices, could avoid CERCIA liability; meanwhile, the employee
charged with the job of actually carrying out the disposal activities or
making the disposal arrangements-even if he or she has no meaningful
decisionmaking authority-could not avoid personal liability.15
6
Because Georgoulis's "mandates left no room for others to exercise any
decision making authority orjudgment in any area of the business,"1 57 the
court found that he "exercised some control ... indirectly[ ] over the ar-
rangement for disposal." 158
In reaching its conclusion, the court found Georgoulis's involvement
in WFE's activities, and power exerted over WFE's employees, dispositive.
The court stated:
[T]ihe undisputed facts show that Georgoulis had the authority to control
virtually every aspect of WFE's operations and indirectly control others.
We find it beyond dispute that Georgoulis, in his capacity as board chair-
man and chief executive officer of WFE, so usurped the power of those
ensure that responsible persons are not allowed to avoid liability by remaining idle.") (citing TIC,
866 F. Supp. at 1177 (citations omitted)).
151 United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Gir. 1989).
152 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1088.
153 48 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S .Ct. 73 (1995).
154 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1088 (citing Gurey, 43 F.3d at 1194).
155 Id. at 1088-89 (quoting Gurey, 43 F.3d at 1194).
156 Id. at 1089.
157 Id. at 1090.
158 Id.
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who were only nominally running WFE that he undertook responsibility
for all of WFE's decision making; he so tightly controlled WFE, particu-
larly its budgetary aspects, that he left WFE employees no other choice
but to continue with the relatively inexpensive arrangement that had his-
torically existed between WFE and HEC. In other words, Georgoulis's
actions inexorably led to the continuation of the disposal of WFE's wastes
at the dumpsite. 159
Finally, the court stated that the lack of personal knowledge of WFE's
hazardous waste disposal activities did not excuse Georgoulis from
liability.' 6
0
2. Arranger Liability and Parent Corporations
The Eighth Circuit held that the standard for finding direct arranger
liability under CERCLA § 107(a) (3) for parent corporations is the same
standard for corporate officers: whether the "parent had authority to con-
trol and exercised actual or substantial control, directly or indirectly, over
the arrangement for disposal, or the off-site disposal, of the subsidiary's
hazardous substances."
16 1
In doing so, the court of appeals rejected the district court's actual
control test. The court explained that, in contrast to the district court's
reasoning, the standard for determining liability for a parent corporation
as an arranger is "significantly" different, and more stringent, than liability
as an operator. The court reasoned that the statute makes a critical distinc-
tion between operator and arranger liability because CERCLA § 107(a) (2)
only requires a "person" to operate the disposal facility at the time of dispo-
sal-imposing direct operator liability when the parent corporation had
authority to control, and exercised substantial or actual control, over the
subsidiary. Conversely, CERCLA § 107(a) (3) requires the person to ar-
range for the disposal, treatment, or transportation for disposal or treat-
ment-imposing direct arranger liability where there is "some causal
connection or nexus" between the parent corporation's activities and the
subsidiary's arrangement for disposal.' 62 The court recognized that this
will be a fact intensive inquiry that is based upon the totality of the
circumstances.
63
In reversing the district court's summary judgment in favor of the par-
ent corporation, the court of appeals found that it was not clear from the
record that Georgoulis's activities in WFE's affairs were in his capacity as an
officer or director of the parent corporation. The mere fact that Georgou-
lis and other officers served concurrently for both WFE and the parent
corporation did not, "in and of itself," establish liability for the parent cor-
poration. 6 4 As a result, the court only evaluated the facts relevant to the
parent corporation's working relationship with the subsidiary, WE, and
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 1092.
162 Id. at 1091-92.
163 Id. at 1092.
164 Id.
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found there was a genuine issue whether the parent corporation "exercised
actual or substantial control, directly or indirectly, over WFE's waste dispo-
sal arrangement" which precluded summary judgment.165
VI. ANALYSIS OF TIC
A. Arranger Liability and Corporate Officers
1. Authority to Control
While several courts have adopted the authority to control test articu-
lated in United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.
(NEPACCO)166  for determining operator liability under CERCLA
§ 107(a) (2), the Eighth Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that
NEPACCO's authority to control test applied equally to arranger liability.
167
The court noted that its recent decisions in United States v. Gurley 68 and
United States v. Vertac Chemicals Corp.169 made it clear that arranger liability
required more than the authority to control test. This is important to note
because several courts have adopted the authority to control test.
2. CERCLA's Goals and Defining Responsible Parties
In TIC, the Eighth Circuit stated that the twin goals of CERCLA are
"(1) to ensure that those responsible for the problems caused by hazardous
wastes are required to pay for the cleanup costs ... and (2) to ensure that
responsible persons are not allowed to avoid liability by remaining idle."'
70
Yet, it is well settled that the two goals of CERCLA are to (1) allow for the
immediate cleanup of a release, or a threat of release, of hazardous sub-
stances, and (2) make those responsible for the disposal of the hazardous
substances pay for the cleanup.17'
165 Id.
166 810 F.2d 726 (1986).
167 Defendants argued that NEPACCO, on its facts, was clearly distinguishable from TIC be-
cause the employee in NEPACCO, who was found to be liable as an arranger, "actually knew
about, had immediate supervision over, and was directly responsible for arranging for the trans-
portation and disposal of the NEPACCO plant's hazardous substances." United States v. TIC Inv.
Corp., 68 F.3d 1082, 1087 (quoting NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 743). In TIC, neither the corporate
officer nor the parent corporation had any involvement with the corporations hazardous waste
activities.
168 43 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1994).
169 46 F.3d 803 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2609 (1995). In Vertac, the court explained
that CERCLA § 107(a) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (3), in addition to requiring the party to arrange
for the disposal or treatment of hazardous substances, also requires that the hazardous substances
be "owned or possessed by" the same party who arranged for the disposal or treatment of the
hazardous substances. Thus, the court explained, NEPACCO involved the issue of whether a cor-
porate employee could be found to have "owned or possessed" the hazardous substances within
the meaning of CERCLA § 107(a) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (3). The NEPACCO court applied the
authority to control test to determine whether the corporate employee "owned or possessed" the
hazardous substances. It was not used as the standard to determine whether the party "arranged
for" the disposal of the hazardous substances. Vertac, 46 F.3d at 810.
170 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1088 (quoting TIC, 866 F. Supp. at 1177 (citations omitted)).
171 The First Circuit stated the goals succinctly in the following often quoted passage:
First, Congress intended that the federal government be immediately given the tools
necessary for a prompt and effective response to the problems of national magnitude
resulting from hazardous waste disposal. Second, Congress intended that those responsi-
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Nothing in the legislative history supports the court's assertion that
one of Congress's primary goals in enacting CERCLA was to prevent re-
sponsible persons from avoiding liability by remaining idle. By focusing on
liability for inaction, this seemingly insignificant interpretation of CER-
CLA's statutory goals opens the door for finding parties directly liable
under the statute where the party did not actively participate in the
wrongdoing.
Because holding responsible parties liable for releases of hazardous
waste is a primary goal of CERCLA, how the statute defines responsibility is
of utmost importance. However, as one commentator noted, simply identi-
fying imposition of liability on responsible persons as a goal does not help
determine which rules of liability should apply. The rules of liability cho-
sen will directly determine which parties will be responsible. 72 This
presents a problem of circularity: one cannot determine whether liability
under CERCLA attaches to a party until one determines which rules of
liability apply.'73
As the varied opinions by the courts of appeals on CERCLA liability
indicate, 7 4 neither the statute nor its legislative history positively indicates
which rules of liability apply.'7 5 Combining the lack of evidence of Con-
gressional intent to significantly alter the traditional corporate law doctrine
of limited liability with the accepted rules of statutory construction, it fol-
lows that the federal courts should adhere to the limited liability rules pro-
vided by the corporate form. 76
ble for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and respon-
sibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created.
Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986). Some
commentators argue that replenishing the Superfund is a third goal of CERCLA and this goal
warrants going beyond the traditional liability rules to find parties responsible for cleanups. De-
fenders of this position posit that this goal is at least implied in the statute because the President
needs the proceeds from the Superfund to operate under the statute. See generally Note, Liability
of Parent Corporations, supra note 4 (arguing that a parent corporation's ability to escape liability
under traditional corporate law doctrine is counter to the goals of CERC.A because it either
delays or reduces recovery of funds necessary for further remedial activities).
172 See Dennis, supra note 4, at 1475-76.
173 To illustrate the circularity problem, one commentator used the following example: Cor-
poration X is responsible for a release of a hazardous substance, and the president of Corpora-
tion X actively participated in the management of the corporation. However, the president did
not participate in, nor have any knowledge of, the activities that led to the release of the hazard-
ous substances. Hence, whether the president is liable for Corporation X's release of the hazard-
ous substance will depend on whether the court applies traditional corporate law doctrine
requiring the corporate officer actually to participate in the activity that caused the release, or
uses a lesser standard similar to the Second Circuit's obligation to control. Thus, by hypothesis,
the president is not "responsible" unless the court rejects the traditional corporate law doctrine
and chooses the capacity to control standard. l-
174 For a discussion of the split in the federal circuits over the proper standard for imposing
direct arranger liability, see supra Part IV.B.
175 SeeJoslyn Mfg. Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that
there is "little in the history of CERCLA to indicate that Congress intended to make such a signifi-
cant change in corporation law principles");Joslyn Corp. v. T.L James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222,
226 (W.D. La. 1988) ("neither the clear language of CERCLA nor its legislative history provides
authority for imposing individual liability on corporate officers or direct liability on parent corpo-
rations") (citing Cronk & Huddleston, Corporate Officer Liability, supra note 4); Dennis, supra note
4, at 1393-94.
176 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986) ("The normal rule of
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a
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3. Actual Participation
The Eighth Circuit posited that the reasoning in its opinion in Gur-
/ly177 supports a finding that the standard for imposing arranger liability on
officers is different from employees because "persons who are officers, di-
rectors, or shareholders are more likely to cause a company to dispose of
hazardous wastes.' 178 As a result, the court argues, a mere employee must
participate directly by either performing the task or directing the task,
whereas an officer may be directly liable without participating in the haz-
ardous waste disposal activities. The court acknowledges that arranger lia-
bility requires "some level of participation, or exercise of control over,
activities that are causally connected to, or have a nexus with," the hazard-
ous disposal activities. The court contends that this "nexus" for direct lia-
bility can be met by showing that the officer "exercised actual or substantial
control, directly or indirectly, over the arrangement for disposal" of the haz-
ardous waste.
The Eighth Circuit's reasoning appears to be deficient for several rea-
sons. To impose direct liability on a corporate officer, the officer must
actually participate in the wrongdoing.179 Since the corporate officer is an
agent of the corporation, the language in Gurley with respect to employee
liability applies equally to corporate officers. Consequently, direct liability
will attach to a corporate officer if the corporate officer (1) had the author-
ity to control the hazardous waste activities, and (2) actually exercised that
authority, either by personally performing the tasks, or directing others to
perform the tasks, necessary to dispose of the hazardous wastes.' 80
The court found that direct liability under CERCLA § 107(a) (3) re-
quires "some causal connection or nexus" between the defendant's activi-
ties and the corporation's arrangement for disposal.'81 The causation or
nexus requirement for direct liability is perfectly in accordance with tradi-
tional corporate law doctrine: officers are liable for the torts they person-
ally commit, even if they commit them while acting in their official
capacity. 8 2 The issue then is what nexus warrants imposing direct ar-
ranger liability on a potentially responsible party.
judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific."), quoted inJoslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L.James &
Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 80, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1990); DeBreceni v. Graf Bros. Leasing, Inc., 828 F.2d 877,
880 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[Tlhe principle of limited liability for corporate debts is longstanding
enough and important enough to be considered a background norm, against which Congress
may act of course, but which is controlling in the absence of such action."), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1064 (1988), cited in Dennis, supra note 4, at n.109.
177 43 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1994). See supra note 79 for a discussion of the Eighth Circuit's
opinion in Gurley.
178 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Gurley, 43 F.3d at 1194).
179 See supra Part III.
180 See Gurley, 43 F.3d at 1193, cited in TIC, 68 F.3d at 1087.
181 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1091-92 (although the court was speaking in the context of direct liability
for parent corporations, the author infers that the court intended for the causation requirement
to apply to direct liability for corporate officers as well).
182 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 37, § 1137:
An officer of a corporation who takes part in the commission of a tort by the corpora-
tion is personally liable for resulting injuries; but an officer who takes no part in the
commission of the tort is not personally liable to third persons for the torts of other
agents, officers or employees of the corporation. Officers and directors may be held
individually liable for personal participation in tortious acts even though they derived
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The Eighth Circuit's analysis that one can meet the nexus requirement
for direct liability by showing that the officer "did in fact exercise actual or
substantial control... directly... over the arrangement for disposal"' 83 is
consistent with the actual participation requirement found in corporate
law.'84 This is the accepted standard in both federal and state courts.18 5
The Eighth Circuit's analysis falters, however, where it states that one can
meet the nexus requirement by showing the officer "exercised actual or
substantial control... indirectly, over the arrangement for disposal."18 6 The
addition of indirectly to the direct liability standard is an unwarranted de-
parture from the well established actual participation standard because di-
rect arranger liability under CERCLA § 107(a) (3) "implies intentional
action." 18 7 It follows that direct liability as an arranger requires the individ-
ual to take intentional action with respect to the corporation's hazardous
waste disposal activities. In other words, the standard for direct arranger
liability under CERCLA § 107(a) (3) should be essentially the participation
standard applied by other courts: the individual must actually participate
directly in the corporation's hazardous waste disposal activities.
Finally, clearly defining key words used in the statute is helpful. Indi-
rect is the antonym of direct. Consequently, a party cannot be directly lia-
ble for indirect activity. In TIC, the facts were undisputed: the defendant
did not participate directly in any of the corporation's hazardous waste dis-
posal practices or decisions. Accordingly, the Eight Circuit should not
have imposed direct arranger liability on the corporate officer who did not
directly participate in the corporation's hazardous waste activities.
4. Indirect Liability: Piercing the Corporate Veil
The preceding discussion is not meant to imply that a party cannot be
liable for indirect activity. Piercing the corporate veil imposes liability on
parties for indirect activities.' 88 The court's opinion blurred the line be-
tween direct liability and indirect liability: all of the facts the court used to
explain how the corporate officer indirectly controlled the corporation are
typically evaluated when piercing the corporate veil.' 89
Since Georgoulis was the sole shareholder of WFE, and he completely
dominated the corporation, it is very likely that the Eighth Circuit would
have imposed indirect liability on Georgoulis by piercing the corporate veil
no personal benefit, but acted on behalf, and in the name of, the corporation, and the
corporation alone was enriched by the acts.
183 TIC, 68 F.d at 1089.
184 See 3AW. FLETCHER, supra note 37, § 1137.
185 Id.; see also Dennis, supra note 4, at 1411 (noting the doctrine that officers and directors
are personally liable for torts where they actively participated is firmly embedded in both federal
and state common law).
186 TIC, 68 F.d at 1089 (emphasis added).
187 Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1993), quoted in TIC, 68 F.3d
at 1087. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's holding in Amcast, see supra Part IV.
188 See supra Part III.B. (discussing indirect liability).
189 The court's analysis of the corporate officer's actions focused almost entirely on the
amount of control the corporate officer exerted over the corporation. TIC, 68 F.3d at 1090.
Control is the first prong of the alter ego test. See supra Part III.B.
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had they conducted the analysis. 190 Interestingly, many of the facts the
Eighth Circuit listed detailing Georgoulis's involvement in WFE's affairs
are pertinent to the analysis under the alter ego theory of piercing the
corporate veil. The first prong (unity of interest and ownership) of the
two-prong alter ego test would be satisfied based upon the facts that Ge-
orgoulis was the sole shareholder of WFE, and Georgoulis's domination
and control of WFE was nearly complete because he "so usurped the power
of those who were only nominally running WFE that he undertook respon-
sibility for all of WFE's decisionmaking."191 It is also likely that the Eighth
Circuit would find the second prong (inequitable result if the corporate
veil is not pierced) satisfied.1 92 Thus, the Eighth Circuit could have
pierced the corporate veil to impose indirect liability on Georgoulis in his
capacity as shareholder and corporate officer; there was no need to fashion
new, confusing rules of liability for corporate officers, directors and
shareholders.
5. Public Policy
The Eighth Circuit announced that the public policy rationale sup-
porting their decision in TIC was to close a loophole created for "powerful
individuals" who have virtually unlimited power and who in fact exercise
control of the company's hazardous waste activities but who know "well
enough to close his or her eyes to the specific details of the company's
hazardous waste disposal activities."
193
CERCLA attempts to "hold responsible parties liable for the costs of
[the] cleanups."' 94 The statute does not attempt to impose direct liability
on parties responsible for other activities of the corporation, even if the
party is directly responsible for every activity in the company except for the
hazardous waste disposal activities. Nothing in the statute or its legislative
history warrants changing this fundamental principle of corporate law.195
As the Fifth Circuit noted, "The 'normal rule of statutory construction is
that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a
judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific.' Any bold rewriting
of corporation law in this area is best left to Congress."' 96 The statutory
language in CERCLA does not go that far. The act of imposing direct lia-
bility upon a corporate officer for indirect activity would be a serious depar-
ture from the fundamental principle of limited liability. As two
commentators noted prior to the Eight Circuit's decision in TIC, courts
190 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 37, § 41.10 at 615 ("Whenever one in control of a corporation
uses that control, or uses the corporate assets, to further his or her own personal interests, the
fiction of the separate corporate identity may properly be disregarded.").
191 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1090.
192 See supra Part V.C. for a discussion of the Eighth Circuit's reasons for finding Georgoulis
liable.
193 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1089.
194 H.R. Rep. No. 253(111), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
8038, 3038.
195 Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1990); Wallace, supra note
4, at 853.
196 Joslyn, 893 F.2d at 82-83 (quoting Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey, 474 U.S. 494, 501
(1986)).
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have only imposed liability on a corporate officer under CERCLA where
the officer participated in the wrongful act.'97
This is not to say that a corporate officer who shirks a duty (i.e, looks
the other way to purposefully avoid personal participation in the waste dis-
posal activities) cannot be directly liable. In a case where an officer shirks a
legal duty by "looking the other way," the officer could be directly liable for
a breach of duty since breach of duty through nonfeasance gives rise to
direct liability just as does breach of duty through misfeasance or malfea-
sance.' 98 Hence, if an officer is responsible for managing or supervising
the company's hazardous waste disposal activities, that officer cannot avoid
liability by not acting. It follows that the concern expressed by the Eighth
Circuit regarding a "loophole" in the liability scheme for a corporate of-
ficer who "knows well enough to close his or her eyes to the specific details
of the company's hazardous waste disposal practices" is unfounded.
One could argue that the corporate officer could then avoid liability
by avoiding responsibility for the company's hazardous waste disposal activ-
ities. This may be true, but this is consistent with a basic tenet of tort law:
if there is no legal duty, there can be no breach of a legal duty. 99 Hence, if
a plaintiff cannot meet the minimum requirement of showing there was a
legal duty to act, the officer, by his inactivity (here, nonfeasance), cannot
be directly liable for breaching a nonexistent legal duty.
The court also expressed a concern that the responsible corporate of-
ficer could escape liability by "closing his or her eyes" to the disposal activi-
ties while the employee "charged with the job of actually carrying out the
disposal activities" could not avoid liability.2 0 0 The word "charged" implies
that the employee was directed by someone to carry out the disposal activi-
ties. Under the proposed standard that adopts traditional corporate law
doctrine, the individual who directed the employee to carry out the dispo-
sal activities would be directly liable as an arranger. It would be an ex-
tremely rare case where the fact finder could not determine who directed
the employee to carry out the disposal activities if in fact the employee
received such direction.
197 Oswald & Schipani, supra note 4, at 329-30.
198 See 3AW. FLETCHER, supra note 37, § 1135, at 290 ("Personal liability attaches, regardless of
whether the breach was accomplished through malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance."),
quoted in Oswald & Schipani, supra note 4, at n.180.
199 PROSSER, supra note 36, § 1.
200 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1089 (emphasis added). This Note does not attempt to debate the merits
of the strict liability provisions of CERCLA imposing liability on an employee who merely carries
out the direction of others with respect to "arranging for" the disposal or treatment of hazardous
substances. Several commentators have criticized the strict liability scheme of CERCLA. For a
discussion of the merits of CERCLA's strict liability scheme, see Oswald, Strict Liability, supra note
4. If one agrees that imposing direct liability on an employee for merely carrying out the em-
ployee's duties is an inequitable result, then it does not necessarily follow that.imposing liabilty
on a manager who does not participate at all in the hazardous waste activities of the corporation
will make the first result equitable. In other words, it seems that this argument implies that two
wrongs make a right.
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6. General Budget Policies
In analyzing the amount of activity required by a corporate officer to
warrant imposing direct liability, the Eighth Circuit adopted the EPA's ar-
gument that the participation standard would
insulate from liability those who own and intrusively run organizations,
those who effectively dictate their hazardous waste decisions through day-
to-day strict control of budgets, production, and capital investment, those
who strip the company of its cash and its independent decision-making,
but who do not trouble themselves with the cost-cutting disposal practices
of their company.
20'
There are several responses to this concern. First, as mentioned previously,
corporate officers are employees of the corporation and do not "own" the
corporation by virtue of their position in the corporation. 20 2 Hence, this
statement is inapplicable to corporate officers where it refers to those who
"own" the organization.
Second, responsibility for strict control of budgets could be said about
almost every corporate officer. In many cases, the corporate officer would
breach her fiduciary duty to the corporation if she did not manage the
financial status of the corporation.203 The Eighth Circuit found Georgou-
lis's involvement in WFE's budget decisions, in his capacity as board chair-
man and chief executive officer of WFE, to be the most significant factor in
finding him directly liable as an arranger.204 The court conceded that Ge-
orgoulis had nothing to do with the original arrangement, nor did he ever
participate in any hazardous waste disposal activities. Yet, it held that Ge-
orgoulis's involvement in WFE's budget decisions led to the continuation
of WFE's hazardous waste disposal activities. The court in essence found
that a corporate officer arranged for the disposal of hazardous wastes by
participating in budget decisions whose only "trickle down" effect on the
corporation's hazardous waste disposal practice was to continue the dispo-
sal practice utilized before the corporate officer was involved with the cor-
poration.20 5 In other words, although the corporation's disposal practices
did not change after the corporate officer arrived, and there was no evi-
dence that the corporate officer participated in hazardous waste disposal
201 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1089.
202 See supra Part III and accompanying text, explaining the particulars of the position of
corporate officer. While corporate officers often may own shares in the corporation, in some
cases 100% of the shares, the officers would own the shares in their capacity as a shareholder.
The point is that this is separate and distinct from their capacity as a corporate officer.
203 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 37, § 1029.
204 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1090.
We find it beyond dispute that Georgoulis, in his capacity as board chairman and chief
executive officer, so usurped the power of those who were only nominally running WFE
that he undertook responsibility for all of WFE's decisionmaking; he so tightly con-
trolled WFE, particularly its budgetary aspects, that he left WFE employees no other choice
but to continue with the relatively inexpensive arrangement that had historically existed
between WFE and HEC. In other words, Georgoulis's actions inexorably led to the con-
tinuation of the disposal of WFE's wastes at the dumpsite.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
205 Id. at 1084.
[Vol. 71:4
1996] NOTE-DIRECr LIABILITY AS AN ARRANGER UNDER CERCLA § 107(a) (3) 763
activities, the court still found that the corporate officer arranged for the
disposal of the hazardous waste.206 This seems to be an inequitable result.
The same can be said for managing the areas of production and capi-
tal investment. If strictly managing a corporation's budget on a macro
level warrants imposing liability as an arranger, it would be a radical depar-
ture from the traditional rules of liability for corporate officers. Further, it
would sweep in individual officers who simply had nothing to do with a
corporation's hazardous waste disposal activities.
Third, and most importantly, indirect liability by piercing the corpo-
rate veil already addresses concerns over officers and owners who "intru-
sively run organizations," and "effectively dictate their decisions by day-to-
day strict control of budgets, production, and capital investment and strip
the company of its cash and its independent decision-making." 20 7 These
factors are typically the focus of a court's inquiry when determining
whether to pierce the corporate veil. Hence, the capability to impose liabil-
ity on intrusive corporate officers and shareholders by piercing the corpo-
rate veil appears to address many of the Eighth Circuit's concerns.
B. Arranger Liability and Parent Corporations
1. Direct Liability
After discussing arranger liability for corporate officers, the Eighth
Circuit addressed arranger liability for parent corporations. The court an-
nounced essentially the same standard as that for corporate officers: the
parent corporation is liable as an arranger where the parent "had the au-
thority to control and exercised actual or substantial control, directly or
indirectly, over the arrangement for disposal... of the subsidiary's hazard-
ous substances."208 Because the statute includes both individuals and cor-
porations in its definition of "persons" who may be liable,20 9 the court
reasoned that the direct liability standard for corporate officers and parent
corporations should be the same.210 Admittedly, one may impose indirect
liability on parent corporations by piercing the corporate veil. It is signifi-
cant to note that the Eighth Circuit is not the first court to find that CER-
CIA § 107(a) warrants imposing direct liability on a parent corporation for
a subsidiary's actions.21' And these courts present appealing arguments.
However, the conclusion that CERCLA authorizes imposing direct ar-
206 Id. at 1090.
207 See supra Part -I.B, describing the numerous factors courts consider when determining
whether to pierce the corporate veil.
208 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1092.
209 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
210 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1091.
211 See, e.g., United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding parent
corporation directly liable as an operator), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991); Joslyn Mfg. Co. v.
T.L. James & Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1990) (listing New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,
759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988); Colorado
v. Idarodo Mining Co., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20578 (D. Colo. 1987); Vermont v. Staco,
Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho
(1986)); see also Oswald & Schipani, supra note 4, at 301 nn.228-30 (listing numerous articles
discussing parent corporation liability and noting that there are two views of parent corporation
liability for the environmental torts of their subsidiaries: parent may only be liable by piercing
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ranger liability on parent corporations disregards a fundamental tenet of
corporate law: because parent corporations are shareholders, the corpo-
rate veil shields parent corporations from being directly liable for their sub-
sidiary's torts.
212
The Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co. 213
for not disregarding the limited liability for parent corporations is persua-
sive. It is well settled that when Congress desires to alter the interpretation
or meaning of ajudicially created concept (here, limited liability for parent
corporations), "it must make that intent specific."214 The different opin-
ions articulated by the federal courts support the position that Congress
did not specifically express a desire to alter the limited liability of parent
corporations. 21
5
Further buttressing this position, it is clear that Congress has the
power to create statutes that specifically provide direct liability for share-
holders and parent corporations for the actions of a corporation.21 6 More-
over, Congress reauthorized CERCLA in 1986;217 even with a second
opportunity to specifically impose direct liability on shareholders and par-
ent corporations, Congress chose not to do so. 2 18 As the Supreme Court
noted, "[S]ilence is most eloquent, for such reticence while contemplating
an important and controversial change in existing law is unlikely."219 Ac-
cordingly, although the Eighth Circuit presented several appealing argu-
ments, imposing direct liabilty on parent corporations as arrangers
disregards the common law principle of limited liability for parent
corporations.
2. Indirect Liability: Piercing the Corporate Veil
As discussed previously, courts may impose indirect liability on a par-
ent corporation for a subsidiary's environmental torts by piercing the cor-
porate veil. 220 In TIC, the Eighth Circuit should have applied the two-
prong test of the alter ego theory of piercing the corporate veil.22 ' Because
the court did not evaluate the possibility of imposing indirect liability on
the corporate veil; and parent may be directly liable where the parent exercises sufficient control
over the subsidiary).
212 See supra Part III.B. For a view espousing direct liability for parent corporations under
CERCLA, see Healy, supra note 4, at 124-27; Note, Liability of Parent Corporations For Hazardous
Waste Cleanup and Damages, 99 HARv. L. Rrv. 986 (1986).
213 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).
214 Id at 83 (quoting Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. NewJersey, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986)).
215 See supra Part IV.B.
216 See, e.g.,Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222, 226 (W.D. La. 1988) (listing
Depository Institution Management Interlocks Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3207; I.R.C. § 1239(b) (2),
(3) (1976); Fair Labor Standards Act § 3(r), 29 U.S.C. § 203(r); and Employee Retirement Insur-
ance Security Act § 4001(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1301 (b)(1)).
217 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)).
218 SeeJoslyn, 893 F.2d at 83 ("If Congress wanted to extend liability to parent corporations it
could have done so, and it remains free to do so.").
219 Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transaflantique, 443 U.S. 256, 267 (1979), quoted in
Joslyn, 893 F.2d at 83.
220 See supra Part IlI.B.
221 See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
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TIC, one can only speculate whether TIC's involvement in WFE's activities
warranted piercing the corporate veil.
222
Thus, a careful analysis of the court's opinion finds its rationale for
disregarding fundamental tenets of corporate law deficient in numerous
respects: neither CERCLA nor its legislative history warrant disregarding
the limited liability of the corporate form; a party cannot be directly liable
for indirect activity; imposing direct liability on nonparticipating corporate
officers does not further public policy; liability based on general budget
policies is unwarranted; and straightforward application of the traditional
rules of liability likely would have found the defendant corporate officer
liable by piercing the corporate veil. As a result, while attempting to fash-
ion new rules of liability under CERCLA, the Eighth Circuit further mud-
died CERCLA's already turbid waters.
VII. PROPOSAL
This Note does not take issue with the Eighth Circuit's final destina-
tion reached in TIC, but rather the route chosen to get there. The proper
test for finding direct liability for a corporate officer as an arranger under
CERCLA § 107(a) (3) should be whether the corporate officer actually and
directly participated in the arrangement for disposal of hazardous sub-
stances. The parent corporation, in its capacity as a shareholder, cannot be
directly liable as an arranger. Courts may impose indirect liability on
either the corporate officer or the parent corporation for a corporation's
(or subsidiary's) arranger liability through the equitable remedy of pierc-
ing the corporate veil. The appropriate standard for piercing the corpo-
rate veil is the well established two-prong alter ego test: (1) that there is
such unity of interest and ownership that separate personalities no longer
exist; and (2) to adhere to the doctrine of a separate corporate entity
would promote injustice.
223
222 Given that the Eighth Circuit found TIC's involvement in the subsidiary's activities did not
warrant summary judgment on the issue of TIC's direct liability, it is reasonable to speculate that
the court would not find summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff for indirect liability.
223 This test requires the court to evaluate numerous factors. See supra notes 48-56. Several
commentators argue that courts, when determining whether to pierce the corporate veil, must
choose between applying either a federal or a state common law alter ego standard. See Dennis,
supra note 4, at 1440-1511 (applying the three-prong test enumerated in United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979), and determining that courts ought to apply state alter ego tests
when determining whether to pierce the corporate veil under CERCLA § 107); Wallace, supra
note 4, at 870-75 (arguing to adopt a federal common law for piercing the corporate veil that
would exclude some more restrictive state elements); Note, Liability of Parent Corporations, supra
note 4, at 999-1003 (arguing that adoption of state alter ego test would undermine the goals of
CERCLA).
It is well settled that federal law governs actions that arise under federal programs. In deter-
mining whether federal or state law should govern actions arising under CERCIA, courts should
apply the test enumerated in Kimbel Foods. Although not the point of this Note, the author agrees
with the Fifth Circuit in that the federal and state alter ego tests appear to be essentially the same.
See United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 690 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1014 (1986) ("we find no need to determine whether a uniform federal alter ego rule is
required, since the federal and state alter ego cases have rarely stated whether they were applying
a federal or state standard, and have cited federal and state cases interchangeably"), quoted in
Joslyn Corp. v. T.L James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222, 226 (W.D. La. 1988). Contra Aronovsky &
Fuller, supra note 4 (arguing that there is a significant difference between federal and state law
when piercing the corporate veil); Wallace, supra note 4.
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The purpose of this proposal is to establish a clear standard of liability
for persons, particularly corporate officers and shareholders, whose corpo-
ration is involved in hazardous waste disposal activities. Moreover, the pro-
posal is predictable in application. It could replace the various standards
applied by several courts, including the Eighth Circuit's opinion in TIC,
that misapply traditional corporate law doctrine. Most importantly, relative
to previous court decisions, the proposal will go further to achieve CER-
CLA's two primary goals: cleaning up sites contaminated with hazardous
waste and making those responsible for the contamination liable for the
cleanup.
First, the proposal adheres strictly to the quintessential tenet of corpo-
rate law: a corporate officer may only be directly liable for a tort in which
the corporate officer actually participates.224 Any individual or corporation
participating directly in the hazardous waste disposal activities of a corpora-
tion may be liable as an arranger. On the other hand, mere involvement in
managerial activities, including budgetary decisions, not directly related to
the hazardous waste disposal activities of a corporation is not enough to
impose direct liability.
Further, to impose indirect liability on corporate officers, directors or
shareholders (parent corporations), the proposal requires a court to apply
the alter ego test when determining whether to pierce the corporate veil.
Thus, where equity requires, a court may impose liability on any officer,
director or shareholder who disregards or abuses the legal separateness of
the corporation. For instance, while the facts in TIC did not warrant im-
posing direct liability on the corporate officer, the facts likely warranted
imposing liability on the same officer by piercing the corporate veil.
Given that in the end, both the Eighth Circuit's standard for arranger
liability announced in TIC and the standard proposed in this Note find the
corporate officer liable, the issue becomes why the proposed standard is
better than the Eighth Circuit's standard.
The potential benefits of this proposal are numerous. First, the clear
standard offered in the proposal, unlike the Eighth Circuit's opinion in
TIC, provides certainty in the law. The proposal will replace the numerous
ad hoc rules announced by several courts of appeals and the subsequent
delays caused by diverse laws with clear, well accepted standards of liability
which will aid in reducing the counterproductive litigation in this area.22 5
The reduction in litigation will in turn free up limited resources that are
better applied toward CERCLA's goal of cleaning up hazardous waste sites.
In addition to reducing litigation, the proposal's clear standards of lia-
bility will go a long way toward reducing the chilling effect that CERCLA
224 See supra Part IIIA
225 See, e.g., ToPOL & SNOW, § 1.1 (noting that sources estimate that well over half of all mon-
ies allocated to hazardous waste cleanups actually pay for legal and administrative expenses to fix
the blame rather than cleanup the wastes); E. Donald Elliot, Jr., Superfund: EPA Succes, National
Debacle?, 6 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 11 (1992) (former EPA general counsel noting that it takes
an average of 10 years to clean up a site and only three years of that time is spent on the cleanup;
argues that the CERCLA cleanup process is too slow and that far too many resources are spent on
administrative and legal expenses rather than on cleanup operations).
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has had on economic activity and development.22 6 The limited liability
provided by the corporate form provides numerous economic benefits for
it is the assumption upon which "large undertakings are rested, vast enter-
prises are launched, and huge sums of capital attracted. '227 Inconsistent
court opinions like that in TIC significantly undermine these fundamental
assumptions. Corporate officers, directors and shareholders are unwilling
to act in an area where there is an unknown risk of a court imposing per-
sonal liability that is strict, joint, and several. 228 Because these parties are
sophisticated in legal matters, they do and will continue to change their
actions accordingly.2 29 Although not the purpose of this Note to prove, it
is reasonable to conclude that the federal courts' overbroad interpretation
of CERCLA's liability net contributes significantly to the "donut hole" ef-
fect now seen throughout the nation in what were formerly prosperous
industrial areas. 23 0
Further, disregarding corporate law could create a "perverse incen-
tive" for "corporate dis-integration" in order for parent corporations to
minimize liability accruing from the subsidiary. 23' This would then put
both potential tort victims and the ability to recover response costs under
CERCLA in a worse position than under traditional rules of limited liabil-
ity: smaller, dis-integrated corporations are less likely to carry insurance
than are the large, multi-layered corporations. 232
Finally, uniform adoption of the proposal would discourage businesses
from locating primarily in jurisdictions with more lenient standards.233
Where each court of appeals has its own standard of liability,234 businesses
would be free to forum shop and locate in the jurisdiction with the more
lenient standard.
In summary, the proper test for finding direct liability for a corporate
officer as an arranger under CERCLA § 107(a) (3) should be whether the
corporate officer actually and directly participated in the arrangement for
disposal of hazardous substances. The parent corporation, in its capacity as
a shareholder, cannot be directly liable as an arranger. Courts may impose
indirect liability on either the corporate officer or the parent corporation
for a corporation's (or subsidiary's) arranger liability through the equitable
226 See, e.g., Julia A. Solo, Comment, Urban Decay and the Role of Superfund: Legal Barriers to
Redevelopment, 43 BuFF. L. REv. 285 (1995).
227 Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944), quoted in United States v. Jon-T Chemicals,
Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 690 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited
Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHi. L. Rwv. 89 (1985) (describing the rationale for the limited
liability of the corporate form and its multiple economic benefits). Contra Note, Liability of Parent
Corporations, supra note 4 (arguing that the investment incentives, risk spreading, and costs of
dispute resolution all favor imposing liability for releases of hazardous waste upon parent corpo-
rations of insolvent responsible parties).
228 See Cronk & Huddleston, Corporate Officer Liability, supra note 4. For a discussion of the
efficacy of strict liability under CERCLA, see Oswald, Strict Liability, supra note 4.
229 "Sophisticated" in the sense that they will likely have legal counsel, and they will make
decisions based upon the latest developments in the law.
230 See, e.g., Solo, supra note 226.
231 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 227, at 110.
232 Id. at 111.
233 United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (quoting
United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802, 809 (W.D. La. 1983)).
234 See supra Part LV.B.
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remedy of piercing the corporate veil. Among the numerous benefits of
this proposal are establishing certainty in the law that will reduce litigation
and increase the quantity of resources devoted to hazardous waste cleanup
operations; reducing the chilling effect CERCLA has had on economic ac-
tivity in industrial areas; preventing creation of a perverse incentive for cor-
porate dis-integration in order for parent corporations to minimize liability
accruing from the subsidiary; and discouraging businesses from locating
primarily in jurisdictions with more lenient standards.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Since Congress passed CERCLA in 1980, federal courts have struggled
to determine the scope of the statute's liability scheme while attempting to
further the government's laudatory goal of responding effectively to re-
leases of hazardous wastes. However, the Eighth Circuit strayed too far
from traditional corporate law doctrine in announcing its standard for im-
posing direct liability as an arranger under CERCLA § 107(a) (3). Specifi-
cally, the court's holding that a corporate officer or parent corporation
could be directly liable as an arranger for indirect activities (i.e., without
actual participation in hazardous waste activities) is outside the bounds of
traditional corporate law. Similar decisions by other federal courts that de-
part from the fundamental tenets of corporate law have led to inconsistent,
conflicting, and unpredictable opinions regarding arranger liability.23 5
The facts in TIC presented the Eighth Circuit with an opportunity to
articulate a standard of liability that adheres to well established principles
of corporte law. Limited liability is a fundamental tenet of traditional cor-
porate law. Yet, in TIC, the Eighth Circuit chose to fashion a new doctrine
that imposes direct liability as an arranger upon parties who did not actu-
ally participate in any manner in the arrangement for disposal of the haz-
ardous waste.
The Eighth Circuit presented several appealing reasons for articulat-
ing a new standard for arranger liability under CERCLA § 107(a) (3). How-
ever, a careful analysis of the court's opinion reveals that the court's
rationale for disregarding the limited liability of the corporate form may be
unwarranted for several reasons: First, neither CERCLA nor its legislative
history expressly provide for disregarding the limited liability of the corpo-
rate form. Second, a party cannot be directly liable for indirect activity.
Third, imposing direct liability on nonparticipating corporate officers does
not further public policy. Fourth, liability based on general budget policies
is unwarranted. Finally, straightforward application of the traditional rules
of liability likely would have found the defendant corporate officer liable
by piercing the corporate veil. As a result, instead of helping to clarify the
law in this area by applying fundamentals of corporate law, it appears that
the Eight Circuit may have further muddied CERCLA's already turbid
waters.
The proper test for finding direct liability for a corporate officer as an
arranger under CERCLA § 107(a) (3) should be whether the corporate of-
235 See supra Part IV.
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ficer actually and directly participated in the arrangement for disposal of
hazardous substances. The parent corporation, in its capacity as a share-
holder, cannot be directly liable as an arranger. Courts may impose indi-
rect liability on either the corporate officer or the parent corporation for a
corporation's (or subsidiary's) arranger liability through the equitable rem-
edy of piercing the corporate veil.
The proposal establishes a clear standard of liability for persons, par-
ticularly corporate officers and shareholders, whose corporation may be
involved in hazardous waste disposal activities. Moreover, the proposal is
predictable in application. Relative to previous varying and conflicting
court decisions, the proposal will go further to achieve CERCLA's two pri-
mary goals: cleaning up sites contaminated with hazardous waste and mak-
ing those responsible for the contamination liable for the cleanup. Finally,
in the absence of express Congressional intent to the contrary, only impos-
ing direct liability on persons for wrongs in which they actually participate
is consistent with traditional notions ofjustice.
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